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§ 1 Introduction 
 
§ 1.1 A growing interest for monitoring 
 
 
“There is a gap between the rights proclaimed in international and regional human rights 
instruments and how these rights are respected in individual countries. In fact, all states 
encounter challenges in their work towards complete fulfilment of human rights. Scarce 
resources are often invoked as the main obstacle. Corruption, internal tensions, racism and 
intolerance are other obstacles to real progress. Serious violations of human rights also take 
place in countries that are considered stable and non-corrupt”.
1
 
 
With these words Mr Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe, introduced his new Recommendation on systematic work for imple-
menting human rights at the national level. The text was issued on 18 February 2009, on 
the occasion of the publication of the proceedings of an international conference on 
systematic work for human rights implementation.
2
 Meanwhile the EU Fundamental 
Rights Agency published an up-dated overview of anti-Semitism in the European Union. 
The accompanying press release stressed one point in particular: “The 2009 report notes 
that a significant number of Member States do not maintain official or even unofficial 
data and statistics on anti-Semitic incidents”.
3
 
 These publications and initiatives – all from 2009 – reflect the growing interest for 
a more systematic approach to human rights implementation and monitoring at the 
national level. More and more countries develop strategies or action plans targeting 
specific problems, such as racism or trafficking in human beings. Several countries have 
adopted comprehensive action plans seeking to address the human rights situation in a 
coherent manner. National Human Rights Institutes are often instrumental in the 
development of a ‘human rights architecture’ that goes beyond the traditional reliance on 
the quality of legislation and the protection that courts can offer to the individual. 
 At the European level, effective monitoring is a ‘hot topic’ too. It is one thing to 
have a European Court of Human Rights that is empowered to receive individual 
complaints and to deliver binding judgments – but it is quite another thing to make sure 
that the structural problems underlying individuals complaints are addressed. Indeed, 
when the Council of Europe Member States met in May 2009 to celebrate the 
Organisation’s 60
th
 birthday, they adopted a declaration which includes the following: 
 
“We shall also step up our efforts to improve implementation of the [European] Convention 
                                                
1
 T. Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommendation on systematic work for 
implementing human rights at the national level (CommDH(2009)3) Strasbourg, 18 February 2009, 
p. 1. See www.commissioner.coe.int. 
2
 The conference Rights Work! – International Conference on Systematic Work for Human Rights 
Implementation was organised by the Swedish Chairmanship of the Council of Europe’s Committee of 
Ministers in Stockholm on 6-7 November 2008. 
3 EU Fundamental Rights Agency, Anti-Semitism Summary Overview of the Situation in the European 
Union 2001-2008, Vienna, 2 March 2009. See www.fra.europa.eu. 
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 [on Human Rights] at national level, including through the full and complete execution of the 
judgments delivered by the Court”.
4
 
 
In an effort to supplement these general statements with concrete action, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has put the implementation of 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights high on the agenda. Cypriot 
parliamentarian Mr Christos Pourgourides, who was appointed rapporteur on this subject, 
embarked on a series of visits to Member States that experience serious problems in this 
area. On 9 July 2009 he ended a two-day visit to Kyiv with a call for greater domestic 
parliamentary supervision to ensure that Ukraine implements judgments of the Court.
5
  
 All these activities may easily obscure the fact that the focus on implementation is 
fairly novel.
6
 At least four developments occurring the 1990s sparked off the current 
search for enhanced monitoring techniques: 
 
• in the 1990s Council of Europe membership doubled as a result of the accession 
of Central and Eastern European countries. In the negotiations preparing the 
ground for accession, each candidate State was subjected to close scrutiny of its 
judicial and penal systems, the quality of its democratic institutions, the 
independence of its media and so on. Necessary changes were agreed upon on an 
individualised basis.
7
 After accession of these states, the need was felt to monitor 
the extent to which the new Member States actually complied with these 
obligations and commitments in the field of the Rule of Law and human rights. 
This led to the development of various procedures, involving both the Committee 
of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. 
• simultaneously the number of complaints lodged with the European Commission 
and Court of Human Rights started to grow dramatically. This necessitated not 
only a streamlining of the Strasbourg procedure, but also an analysis of the 
                                                
4
 Declaration adopted at the 119
th
 Session of the Committee of Ministers (Madrid, 12 May 2009), § 3. 
5 During the visit a Memorandum of Understanding was signed as regards regular parliamentary super-
vision of the Strasbourg Court’s judgments. See press release Ukraine: PACE rapporteur calls for 
better implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (9 July 2009, available 
at www.coe.int). 
6
  For an ‘early’ publication, see S.K. Martens, “Individual Complaints under Article 53 ECHR”, in 
R.A. Lawson & M. de Blois (eds.), The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe - 
Essays in Honour of Professor Henry G. Schermers vol. III (1994), pp. 253-292, with a reference to 
existing literature in footnote 6. 
7
  A similar phenomenon occurred a couple of years later in the context of the EU. The situation of 
human rights and the state of the rule of law in candidate countries were subjected to detailed 
monitoring. However, as a rule this comprehensive ex ante human rights monitoring of candidate 
countries was not matched by ex post control – the two notable exceptions being Romania and 
Bulgaria. Even in 2009 they are still subject to the ‘Cooperation and Verification Mechanism’, set up 
in the eve of EU accession. The two most recent reports were published on 22 July 2009 and 
provided for extension of the mechanism into 2010. In the case of Bulgaria the Commission made 
over 20 recommendations regarding organised crime, the fight against corruption and efficiency of 
the judiciary (see COM(2009)402). Romania was urged to carry out 16 tasks; see COM(2009)401. 
For an overview see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/cvm/index_en.htm 
R.A. Lawson — Lessons from CoE Monitoring 
 
 
 
7   7 
 
 
 driving forces behind these complaints. As a result, the CoE Member States were 
called upon to implement Court judgments quickly, the Court started to 
experiment with pilot procedures, and the Committee of Ministers’ capacity to 
monitor compliance with Court judgments (Article 46 ECHR) was expanded. 
• just a few years earlier, in 1989, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
(CPT) had started to operate. It offered, as Antonio Cassese called it, a “New 
Approach to Human Rights”.
8
 The CPT would not deal with individual 
complaints but carry out on-site visits with a view to establishing an 
institutionalised dialogue with domestic authorities. 
• the germs of the fourth factor can also be found in the early 1990s, even if it only 
came to flourish much later: the Treaty of Maastricht. ‘Maastricht’ 
supplemented the European Communities with a framework for co-operation in 
foreign policy and in ‘home and justice affairs’ as it was then dubbed. The 
primary focus on economic integration was widened and the ambition to offer 
European citizens an ‘Area of freedom, security and justice’ gained prominence. 
Such a development is contingent upon the existence of, and adherence to, shared 
values, since the quality of the judicial system of one Member State becomes co-
dependant on 26 others. In other words: it requires mutual trust that all states 
comply with fundamental rights and the rule of law.
 9
 This in turn presupposes 
that there are mechanisms in place that ensure that the mutual trust is, and 
remains, well-founded. 
 
 
§ 1.2 The special need for monitoring within the EU 
 
At this junction it is interesting to observe that the ‘underlying psychology’ of human 
rights protection within the EU differs from that within the Council of Europe. An 
element of reciprocity enters the scene: without adequate respect for human rights in all 
EU Member States, their common projects, including the Area of freedom, security and 
justice, are under threat. A similar idea was expressed by AG Maduro in 2007: 
 
“[Articles 6 and 7 EU] give expression to the profound conviction that respect for 
fundamental rights is intrinsic in the EU legal order and that, without it, common action by 
and for the peoples of Europe would be unworthy and unfeasible. In that sense, the very 
existence of the European Union is predicated on respect for fundamental rights. Protection of 
the ‘common code’ of fundamental rights accordingly constitutes an existential requirement 
for the EU legal order. … For instance, it would be difficult to envisage citizens of the Union 
exercising their rights of free movement in a Member State where there are systemic 
shortcomings in the protection of fundamental rights. Such systemic shortcomings would, in 
                                                
8
  A. Cassese, ‘A New Approach to Human Rights: The European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 83 (1989), pp. 128-153. 
9
  Cf. R.A. Lawson, “The Contribution of the Agency to the Implementation in the EU of International 
and European Human Rights Instruments”, in Ph. Alston & O. de Schutter (eds.), Monitoring 
Fundamental Rights in the European Union (Hart 2005), pp. 229-251. 
R.A. Lawson — Lessons from CoE Monitoring 
 
 
 
8   8 
 
 
 effect, amount to a violation of the rules on free movement”.
10
  
 
Therefore the EU has a serious problem if, for instance, the European Court of Human 
Rights detects a structural problem affecting the administration of justice or the penal 
system of an EU Member State. This is not a theoretical concern: it happened this spring 
to Poland – twice within two weeks.
11
 
 Such a structural problem cannot but negatively affect co-operation between EU 
Member States. One concrete example may illustrate this point. For many years the 
reception facilities for asylum seekers and irregular immigrants in Greece has been 
subject to strong criticism from various quarters.
12
 But the consequences of this situation 
– which is obviously unacceptable in itself – are not confined to Greece alone: they ‘spill 
over’ to other EU Member States. After the European Court of Human Rights found, for 
its part, in the case of S.D. v. Greece,
13
 that the detention facilities in Greece were 
“degrading” and hence incompatible with Article 3 ECHR, the Court immediately 
received literally dozens of complaints addressed against the Netherlands. The applicants 
were third-country nationals who found themselves in the Netherlands after they had 
entered the EU via Greece. They were about to be sent back by Dutch authorities to 
Greece, pursuant to the so-called ‘Dublin II system’.
14
 Relying on S.D., the applicants 
claimed that the Netherlands was under an obligation not expose them to a situation 
incompatible with Article 3 ECHR. More than 20 applicants requested the Court to 
                                                
10
  Opinion of AG Maduro in Centro Europa 7 (Case C-380/05) of 12 September 2007. 
11
  See ECtHR, 20 January 2009, Slawomir Musial v. Poland (Appl. No. 28300/06) (overcrowding and 
inadequate living conditions in detention facilities) and ECtHR, 3 February 2009, Kauczor v. Poland 
(Appl. No. 45219/06) (excessive length of pre-trial detention). The latter finding was confirmed in 
ECtHR, 19 May 2009, Kulikowski v. Poland (Appl. No. 18353/03), § 85: “...the present case is by no 
means an isolated example of the imposition of unjustifiably lengthy detention but a confirmation of a 
practice found to be contrary to the Convention (...). Consequently, the Court sees no reason to 
diverge from its findings made in the Kauczor case as to the existence of a structural problem and the 
need for the Polish State to adopt measures to remedy the situation”. 
12  See for instance the most recent CPT report on Greece (published 30 June 2009), § 53-54: “The CPT 
must reiterate that the conditions of detention of the vast majority of irregular migrants deprived of 
their liberty in Greece remain unacceptable. (...) The CPT recalls that its first visit to Greece took 
place in March 1993. To date, more than 15 years after that visit, the Committee finds itself in the 
regrettable position that it has to repeat many of its recommendations concerning the prevention of 
ill-treatment. For instance, the 1993 recommendations concerning forensic medical examinations in 
case of allegations of ill-treatment as well as those concerning the application of fundamental 
safeguards, such as in particular the right of access to a doctor and the right of access to a lawyer, 
remain as valid today as they were in 1993. Likewise, recommendations intended to fundamentally 
improve the conditions of detention for irregular migrants have been made in every report since 1997, 
but have been largely ignored by the Greek authorities. The CPT has gone to great lengths over the 
years to convince the Greek authorities to implement the Committee’s recommendations. The 
Committee has visited Greece eight times since 1993 and has also held high-level talks with the 
Greek authorities on two occasions, most recently in February 2007. Until now, to little avail”. 
13
  ECtHR, 11 June 2009, S.D. v. Greece (Appl. No. 53541/07). 
14
  Cf. Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. 
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 indicate, by way of interim measures, that the Dutch authorities should not send them 
back to Greece. In the end a pragmatic solution was found – in that the Greek authorities 
assured the Court that all persons concerned would be treated in full compliance with the 
ECHR – but the episode shows how human rights problems in one EU Member State 
may have an immediate impact on the others. 
 
 
§ 1.3 Research questions 
 
The key question that we thus face is this. How to design a mechanism that will be best in 
securing compliance, by all EU Member States, with existing standards in the field of the 
rule of law and human rights? We will narrow our debate at this stage and concentrate on 
the specific context of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters between EU 
Member States, even if it can be argued, as AG Maduro did, that the free movement of 
persons – and perhaps the entire internal market – would be at risk if systemic 
shortcomings were allowed to persist. 
 The purpose of the present study is to determine which lessons can be learned 
from the practice of the Council of Europe in the field of monitoring. What are strong 
points, what are weak points? Is there a relationship between the way in which 
monitoring is organised and the level of compliance? Are there any attempts to remedy 
perceived shortcomings? 
 There are three reasons to look at the Council of Europe in this connection. In the 
first place, the Council of Europe has developed extensive experience in the field of 
monitoring – not just in connection with the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), but also with many other instruments such as GRECO and the CPT. It would 
simply be a missed opportunity to re-invent the wheel, that is: not to take into account this 
experience when reflecting on the future architecture of monitoring in the context of the 
EU.  
 In the second place, the work of the Council of Europe is of direct relevance to the 
EU. The EU Member States are also members of the Council of Europe, and the close 
relationship between the two organisations was further entrenched with a Memorandum 
of Understanding signed in 2007: 
 
“The Council of Europe and the European Union will develop their relationship in all areas of 
common interest, in particular the promotion and protection of pluralist democracy, the respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, political and legal co-operation (...) 
  The Council of Europe will remain the benchmark for human rights, the rule of law and 
democracy in Europe. (…) 
  The European Union regards the Council of Europe as the Europe-wide reference source 
for human rights. (…) The decisions and conclusions of its monitoring structures will be taken 
into account by the European Union institutions where relevant”.
15
 
 
                                                
15  Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union, Strasbourg, 
11 May 2007, §§ 9, 10, 17. Text available at: http://www.coe.int/t/der/docs/MoU_EN.pdf 
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 This means that any relevant standards developed by the Council of Europe will have to 
be taken into account on a systematic basis by any monitoring mechanisms that the EU 
might wish to develop – even if the EU remains free to provide more extensive 
protection.16 Put differently, when developing mechanisms within the EU, one should not 
lose sight of the gradual emergence of a ‘European Area of Fundamental Rights’.
17
 
 The third reason why the work of the Council of Europe should be taken into 
account is that duplication will have to be avoided. There are legal arguments to support 
that view,18 but it is also useful to note that several observers witness a certain 
‘monitoring fatigue’ amongst Member States. Is this the best time to develop yet more 
monitoring mechanisms? The Council of Europe has developed credible instruments, 
many of which have functioned well for decades. Their findings carry authority, both at 
the judicial and at the political level. Before launching any new initiatives in the context 
of the EU, one must therefore first ascertain the extent to which the Council of Europe 
may already provide for adequate monitoring mechanisms. Will there be any added 
value? Of course it is conceivable that the Union is in need of its own instruments – for 
instance because the dynamics of the internal market and the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice require more rigorous standards in the fight against corruption, or because the 
EU Member States can agree on more generous standards in the field of individual rights, 
or again because they want to create more daring mutual inspection mechanisms as 
‘confidence building measures’. All this is conceivable, but one can only decide whether 
there is a need for new initiatives in the context of the EU, if one has taken stock of 
existing mechanisms established by the Council of Europe. 
                                                
16  Memorandum of Understanding, § 19. See also Article 52 (3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (OJ 2000, C 364). 
17  Cf. the Opinion of AG Maduro in Elgafaji (Case C-465/07) of 9 September 2008: “the protection of 
fundamental rights in the Community legal order exists alongside other European systems of 
protection of fundamental rights. These include both systems developed within the national legal 
systems and those stemming from the ECHR. Each of those protection mechanisms certainly pursues 
objectives which are specific to it and the mechanisms are certainly constructed from legal 
instruments particular to them, but sometimes they apply none the less to the same facts. In such a 
context, it is important, for each existing protection system, while maintaining its independence, to 
seek to understand how the other systems interpret and develop those same fundamental rights in 
order not only to minimise the risk of conflicts, but also to begin a process of informal construction of 
a European area of protection of fundamental rights. The European area thus created will, largely, be 
the product of the various individual contributions from the different protection systems existing at 
European level”. 
18
  Memorandum of Understanding, § 12: “The co-operation will take due account of the comparative 
advantages, the respective competences and expertise of the Council of Europe and the European Union 
– avoiding duplication and fostering synergy –, search for added value and make better use of existing 
resources”. 
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§ 1.4 Some initial reflections 
 
Given that there is a need to enhance the monitoring of domestic Rule of Law/human 
rights performance within the EU, notably in the area of police and judicial co-operation, 
a number of challenging questions could be raised. Which substantive and procedural 
factors impede full compliance
19
 with international standards? What is the impact of the 
way in which international supervision is organised? Which monitoring mechanisms are 
effective, and what makes them effective? How to improve the follow-up by Member 
States? These questions are highly relevant but at the same time, it is submitted, very 
difficult to answer. 
 There is no shortage in Europe of monitoring mechanisms and, as stated above, 
there is growing awareness of the need to secure implementation of fundamental rights at 
the national level. For the Council of Europe this has been its core-business for sixty 
years; for the EU it is vital to ensure that Member States subscribe to the rule of law and 
secure human rights to all. Still violations continue to occur. And still we know very little 
why this is so. Which factors impede full realisation of human rights? Is it scarce 
resources, corruption, internal tensions, or racism and intolerance, as Mr Hammarberg 
suggested?20 Is the national legislator unfamiliar with the Strasbourg case-law, are victims 
unaware of their rights? Is it a problem of access to justice? Or is it a matter of competing 
interests, which national judges happen to weigh differently than their international 
colleagues? Are moral issues involved, and do the core values of one society differ from 
that of others? 
 Thus there are questions concerning the causes; and likewise there are questions 
concerning the remedies. It has been suggested that one supervisory mechanism may be 
more influential than the other.
21
 But we do not know why this is so. It is because of the 
composition of the supervisory bodies? Is it because of the scope of their powers? Is a 
preventive approach more effective than a reactive one? Does it depend on the subject-
matter whether one mechanism is more appropriate, hence more successful, than the 
other? Are unanimous judgments taken more seriously than majority decisions? How 
meaningful are follow-up mechanisms, reporting procedures, on-site visits, or training 
programmes?  
 There is not one single answer to these questions. Literature is scarce and often 
                                                
19
  For the purpose of the present research project, the notion of ‘compliance’ refers to whether Member 
States comply with the legal standard which is set, whether the standard is defined in an international 
treaty, in secondary legislation, or in other, soft-law instruments; generally compliance will require 
both ‘formal’ and ‘practical’ implementation. In this connection ‘formal’ implementation refers to the 
adoption of legal or regulatory instruments that adapt the regulatory framework to the requirements 
set by international standards (for example, copying an EC directive in domestic law). On the other 
hand, ‘practical’ implementation refers to the effective enforcement of existing legislation, in order 
to ensure that it influences behaviour of the persons regulated. 
20
  See footnote 1 supra. 
21
  In an interview a former judge in the European Court of Human Rights noted that the regime in a 
high-security institution did not change despite continued pressure by the CPT; it was only after the 
Court had found a violation of Article 3 ECHR that the regime was softened. See R.A. Lawson, 
“Terugblik op Straatsburg – Interview met W. Thomassen”, in 55 jaar EVRM (2006), p. 20. 
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 anecdotal.
22
 Conversely academic writing tends to remain fairly general when it comes to 
the methodology of measuring human rights.
23
 In 2007 the Council of Europe itself 
published an interesting overview of the impact of its human rights mechanisms – but it is 
limited to “selected examples”, and the document “does not claim to be exhaustive”.
24
 
Indeed, it would be physically impossible to analyse for each of the institutions (and, in 
the case of the European Court of Human Rights: for each of its judgments!) what their 
actual impact is in each of the 47 CoE Member States and which factors were influential 
in that respect. In addition experience tells us that different countries respond very 
differently to monitoring activities.
25
 
 In addition one has to be careful when it comes to causality. If, in the wake of the 
Salduz judgment, the Dutch rules concerning access to a defence lawyer during police 
detention are amended, is this because of the Salduz judgment, is this because the CPT 
had repeatedly called for immediate access to a defence lawyer during police detention, is 
this because the Commissioner for Human Rights during his visit in September 2008 had 
urged the Dutch authorities to grant immediate access to a defence lawyer during police 
detention – or is this because the existing practice was under review anyway?
26
 
Interestingly the Council of Europe’s ‘impact study’ claims that the regime in a Dutch 
high-security institution changed as a result of pressure by the CPT, whereas a former 
judge of the European Court of Human Rights suggested that the CPT was unable to 
bring about a change and that the situation only improved after the Court had found a 
violation of Article 3 ECHR.
27
 
                                                
22
  See for instance I.M. Abels, “Brogan-wetgeving: herziening van de regeling van de 
inverzekeringstelling in het Wetboek van Strafvordering”, in Ars Aequi vol. 44 (1995), pp. 37-43. 
This article describes how one particular ECtHR judgment (in a case involving the UK) led to 
changes in the domestic legislation in one Contracting Party. I am not aware of any comparative 
overview of the implementation of the Brogan judgment in all Contracting Parties – let alone that 
there are such comparative overviews involving more (or even all) judgments. 
23
  On this issue T. Landman & E. Carvalho, Measuring Human Rights to be published in 2009 by 
Routledge-Cavendish. 
24  Council of Europe, DG of Human Rights, Practical impact of the CoE human rights mechanisms in 
improving respect for human rights in member states (Strasbourg, April 2007), p. 5. 
25  Note, for instance, the outright refusal by Russia to implement the Ilascu judgment (ECtHR (GC), 8 
July 2004, Ilascu a.o. v. Moldova and Russia (Appl. 48787/99)) by putting an end to the arbitrary 
detention of the applicants still imprisoned and to secure their immediate release. The Committee of 
Ministers repeatedly criticized Russia in public (see for instance Interim Resolution CM/ResDH 
(2007)106), but to no avail. 
26
  See ECtHR, 27 November 2008, Salduz v. Turkey (Appl. No. 36391/02); CPT, Report to the 
authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the visits carried out to the Kingdom in Europe, 
Aruba, and the Netherlands Antilles by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) in June 2007 (doc. CPT/Inf (2008) 2), § 22 
(with references to earlier reports); Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas 
Hammarberg, on his visit to the Netherlands on 21-25 September 2008 (doc. CommDH(2009)02), § 
24. On the discussion in the Netherlands see the memorandum submitted to Parliament by the 
Minister of Justice on 15 April 2009, No. 5595481/09, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of 30 
June 2009, LJN BH3079 (to be found at www.rechtspraak.nl). 
27  See Council of Europe, Practical impact, supra note 24, p. 18, and compare to the statements of 
Judge Thomassen referred to in note 21 above. 
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§ 1.5 Approach – identifying factors relevant to good Rule of Law review mechanisms 
 
The conclusion of the above is that one should be modest when making statements about 
the effectiveness of international supervisory bodies. The present study will therefore try 
to avoid such statements. No attempt will be made to measure the capacity of monitoring 
bodies to bring about changes in the Member States and increase the degree of 
compliance with their international obligations. Instead, this study will describe a number 
of Council of Europe monitoring mechanisms, analyse their structure and compare their 
working methods.  
 Of course, this exercise is carried out with a view to drawing lessons for 
effective monitoring in the context of the EU. Thus, whilst refraining from firm 
statements about effectiveness as such, an attempt will be made to identify factors that 
appear to be relevant for the impact of the various monitoring bodies. For instance, 
common sense suggests, and insiders confirm, that a shortage of funding may create an 
obstacle to effective monitoring: the capacity to collect data may be impaired, the 
number of on-site visits may be limited, translations may be slow, and so on. To give 
another example: if a committee is unable to check the quality of data provided by 
national correspondents, it is arguably less effective in that respect than a committee that 
can also use data from various independent sources.  
 So – we will look at the various monitoring mechanisms. Who are they, what kind 
of information do they collect and how do they process it? In answering these questions, 
an attempt will be made to show how the mechanisms operate in practice. It was thought 
that it would be more useful to sketch the political and institutional context in which 
they work than to confine the discussion to a dry procedural overview. Thus, a series of 
face-to-face interviews with ‘insiders’ working in Strasbourg was held in order to 
identify strong points and weak points as they are perceived in actual practice. I spoke to 
nine officials as well as two diplomats based in Strasbourg. 
 For a study like this one needs a starting point. Where should one look when 
describing a monitoring body? Common sense dictates – and a recent research paper 
tends to confirm
28
 – that a number of factors are likely to have an impact on the work of 
monitoring bodies, and may affect their effectiveness in a positive or negative way: 
• mandate 
(is the mandate framed in rigid or loose terms? is the monitoring body’s agenda 
pre-determined or is it free to respond to sudden developments? does it focus on 
‘problematic’ countries or does it cover all countries concerned?) 
• membership 
(who is involved in monitoring: independent experts and/or government represen-
tatives? How are they elected?) 
• quality of information 
(does the monitoring body have up-to-date information at its disposal? does it have 
any mechanisms to ensure that the information is reliable? does it have the power to 
                                                
28
  J. Jansen, Practices of the procedures of the Council of Europe Monitoring mechanisms 
(Strasbourg/Groningen), 21 May 2009. The project was supervised by Mr Gerard de Boer, Permanent 
Representation of the Netherlands in Strasbourg. 
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 carry out on-site visits?) 
• standards and further standard-setting 
(are the standards uniform or do they allow for country-specific flexibility?; how 
detailed are they? is there scope for further development of standards?) 
• review process 
(how transparent is the process? how long does a cycle take?) 
• outcome 
(are there any public findings? if so, are they translated and easily accessible in the 
countries concerned? in the case of non-compliance, can sanctions be imposed or 
is assistance provided? is there any further follow-up? does the monitoring body 
attempt to get public or political support for its findings and recommendations?)  
 
With these elements in mind, a number of institutions and bodies established within the 
Council of Europe were reviewed. It was decided to focus on: 
 
• the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE); 
• the Commissioner for Human Rights (CHR); 
• the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR); 
• the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT); 
• the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); and 
• the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). 
 
Given the limited scope of the study, and taking into account the overall focus on police 
and justice matters, no attention will be paid to the European Social Charter, various 
mechanisms to protect minority rights and the bodies set up to fight racism (ECRI) and 
trafficking in human beings (GRETA). The latter body is certainly relevant from the 
perspective of police and judicial co-operation, but it was only established in December 
2008 and it started its operations in 2009.
29
 
 The research is also refined in another way. There is little point in describing the 
relevant standards contained, for instance, in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), or to explain the procedures before the European Court of Human Rights. This 
information is already widely available. What matters for present purposes is the stage in 
which a country is found in default. It has failed, for whatever reason, to implement its 
international obligations; its failure has been detected; and feedback has been given (for 
instance in the form of a judgment, in the case of the Strasbourg Court, or in the form of 
recommendations, in the case of the CPT). What happens then? Which mechanisms have 
been developed in this last stage? In a schematic way: 
 
                                                
29  For more information on GRETA, see 
 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/trafficking/Docs/Monitoring/GRETA_en.asp. 
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If we translate this general scheme to the best-known example, the ECHR, the following 
picture emerges: 
 
 
 
The primary focus of our research, then, is on stage (5). In the context of the European 
Convention, this means the procedure developed by the Committee of Ministers, in 
accordance with Article 46 (2) ECHR, to supervise the execution of judgments delivered 
by the European Court of Human Rights. At the same time, it would be artificial to focus 
exclusively on the last phase and to ignore preceding stages completely. It may well be 
that the quality of stages (3) and (4) – for instance the availability of accurate information 
and the degree of precision with which feedback is given – has an impact on the quality 
of stage (5). Conversely, stage (5) may lead to further standard-setting, for instance 
through the gradual development of guidelines or soft-law standards. 
(2) 
domestic law 
& practice 
(3) 
complaints 
before ECtHR 
(4) 
judgments 
(5) 
supervision 
Art. 46 ECHR 
(1) 
ECHR 
(2) 
implementa-
tion 
(3) 
assessment of 
compliance 
(4) 
feedback 
(5) 
follow-up 
(1) 
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§ 2 Monitoring in the Council of Europe 
 
§ 2.1 Preliminary remarks 
 
This is not the place to introduce the Council of Europe in any great detail. Suffice it to 
make three introductory remarks. 
 In the first place it seems useful to recall that the Heads of State and Government 
of the Member States, at their Third Summit (Warsaw, May 2005) identified the 
preservation and promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law as the core 
objective of the organisation.
30
 Traditionally, the Council of Europe relies heavily on the 
adoption of binding and non-binding legal instruments such as conventions and 
recommendations. Texts are adopted by the Committee of Ministers, in which all 47 
Member States are represented. To date, well over 200 treaties have been adopted and 
opened for signature. Some of them, such as the ECHR and the Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture, have been ratified by all Member States; others remained less 
popular. Recommendations are adopted by consensus and derive their authority from that 
fact. In addition they may acquire legal significance in practice: the European Court of 
Human Rights may take them into account when applying the ECHR, and in recent cases 
the Court went as far as to effectively oblige States to implement them.
31
 
 Secondly, and on a very different note, the difficult financial situation of the 
Council of Europe should be mentioned. Having been subjected to a regime of ‘zero real 
growth’ for a number of consecutive years, the Organisation’s annual budget is now 
approximately 205 million euros (which equals the amount that the EU spends in less 
than a day). The Member States, which provide for the funding, include five ‘grand 
payeurs’ – France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the UK – who each pay 11.9188% or 24 
million euros. The Netherlands pays 3.68% of the regular budget. In the past few years 
the budget of the European Court of Human Rights and its Registry has grown 
considerably, at the expense of other bodies and activities. 
 Attempts to increase the overall budget have been blocked by a group of Member 
States that wants to force the Organisation to concentrate on its core activities (human 
rights, rule of law, democracy) and to spend its budget in a more efficient way. Be that as 
it may, the current situation clearly cannot but have a negative impact on the monitoring 
activities of the Council of Europe. 
 In the third place several observers noted a certain ‘monitoring fatigue’ amongst 
Member States. Especially for smaller Member States the various reporting procedures 
are sometimes quite demanding and, without calling into question their willingness to co-
                                                
30
  See Warsaw Declaration, § 1, and recently confirmed at the 119
th
 Session of the Committee of 
Ministers (Madrid, 12 May 2009). For an interesting attempt to define the concept of the rule of law, 
and to draw up a typology of activities relevant to the rule of law, see The Council of Europe and the 
Rule of Law – An Overview (doc. CM(2008)170 of 21 November 2008). All texts available at 
www.coe.int. 
31
  See e.g. ECtHR, 20 May 2008, Gülmez v. Turkey (Appl. No. 16330/02), § 63: “… the respondent 
state should bring its legislation in line with the principles set out in Articles 57 § 2 (b) and 59 (c) of 
the European Prison Rules”. 
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 operate in good faith, they simply reach the limits of their capacity. A distinct – and even 
more worrying – development is that some Member States have become less co-
operative. Recently the findings of monitoring bodies such as ECRI have been challenged 
head-on by the countries concerned in the Committee of Ministers – something that was 
‘not done’ only a couple of years ago. Malta has been mentioned in this connection as a 
country that fiercely criticised both the accuracy of an ECRI report and the validity of 
ECRI’s recommendations.
32
 This made it easier for other countries, such as Russia, to 
distance themselves as well. If this trend continues, that does not augur well for new 
monitoring mechanisms in the EU. 
 
 
§ 2.2 The Parliamentary Assembly
33
 
 
2.2.1 Description of monitoring activities 
 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) meets four times a year 
for a week-long plenary session in Strasbourg. The 318 representatives and 318 
substitutes are appointed by national parliaments from among their members. Each 
country, depending on its population, has between two and eighteen representatives, 
who provide a balanced reflection of the political forces represented in the national 
parliament.  
 
(a) The Monitoring Committee 
 
The work of PACE is prepared in committees, which also meet between the plenary 
sessions. For present purposes the Committee on Honouring of Obligations and 
Commitments by Member States – or Monitoring Committee, as it is often referred to – 
is of special interest. Pursuant to Resolution 1115 (1997), this committee is responsible 
for seeking to ensure: 
 
(i) the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the member states under the terms of the 
Council of Europe Statute, the European Convention on Human Rights and all other 
conventions concluded within the Organisation to which they are parties; 
(ii). the honouring of the commitments entered into by the authorities of member states on 
their accession to the Council of Europe. 
                                                
32
  ECRI’s Third report on Malta (29 April 2008] contains, as is common practice, the reaction of the 
respondent Government in an appendix. It starts as follows: “ECRI’s third report shows disregard of 
Malta’s vital national interests and disrespect towards its democratic institutions, including 
parliament, the judiciary and the free press. The report falls short of accepted standards of 
impartiality” (p. 38). See ECRI’s database on www.coe.int. The same criticism seems to have been 
voiced in the Committee of Ministers. ECRI’s Annual report on 2008 completely ignored the clash 
with Malta. 
33
  The documents mentioned in this section can be found on PACE’s website: assembly.coe.int. For an 
extensive overview see: Council of Europe, The Parliamentary Assembly – Practice and Procedure 
(Strasbourg, CoE Publishing, tenth ed., 2008). 
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It is worth recalling that the current procedure was preceded by a mechanism, adopted 
in 1993, which was meant to focus exclusively on new CoE Member States.
34
 Under 
that mechanism the Political Affairs Committee and the Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights were instructed “to monitor closely the honouring of commitments 
entered into by the authorities of new member states and to report to the Bureau at 
regular six-monthly intervals until all undertakings have been honoured”.  
 The introduction of the new monitoring mechanism was clearly inspired by the 
rapid expansion of the Council of Europe, which had grown from 23 to 40 Member 
States in less than seven years. There was a widespread concern that not all new 
Member States were in full compliance with the obligations they had undertaken upon 
joining the organisation.  
 Interestingly the work of PACE prompted the Committee of Ministers to 
establish, in 1994, its own monitoring procedure.
35
 No information about this procedure 
was made public, however, and very little can be said about its effectiveness.
36
 It would 
seem that the procedure is no longer applied, even though it was never formally 
abolished. One observer noted that this mechanism simply fell in disuse after Mr Peter 
Leuprecht, then Deputy Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, left the 
organisation. It was felt that “one needs a strong personality” to give clout to the 
exercise and to act as a counterweight to the members of the Committee of Ministers – 
that is, diplomats who are not necessarily interested in in-depth monitoring of their 
domestic situation. The same lesson was drawn from ad hoc missions, such as a series 
of visits to Azerbaijan to address to the situation of political prisoners. It seems fair to 
say that the success of that mission was largely dependent on the determination of 
individual experts.
37
 
 Back to the monitoring instrument developed by PACE in the early 1990s. 
Gradually, the procedure was expanded so as to include all CoE Member States.
38
 
                                                
34
  See Order 488 (1993), adopted 29 June 1993. The instrument was commonly known as the ‘Halonen 
Order’, after the current Finnish President who at the time played an important role in pushing this 
initiative. See also J. Kleijssen, “De Parlementaire Vergadering van de Raad van Europa: Politiek 
toezicht op de naleving van algemene en specifieke verplichtingen van de lidstaten – een overzicht”, 
in NJCM-Bulletin 1997, pp. 653-660. 
35
  See the Declaration on compliance with commitments accepted by member States of the Council of 
Europe, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 November 1994. 
36
  The same conclusion is reached in P. van Dijk a.o., Theory and Practice of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (4
th
 ed., 2006), pp. 318-321. 
37
  In 2001, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, with the approval of the Committee of 
Ministers, instructed a group of independent experts to carry out an investigation concerning the 
political prisoners in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The experts were Professor Stefan Trechsel of Zurich 
University, former President of the European Commission of Human Rights, Professor Evert Alkema 
of Leiden University, former member of the European Commission of Human Rights, and Mr 
Alexander Arabadjiev, former Judge at the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria and former member of 
the European Commission of Human Rights. See PACE Resolution 1272 (2002). 
38
  In Resolution 1031 (1994) PACE observed “observed "that all member states of the Council of 
Europe are required to respect their obligations under the Statute, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and all other conventions to which they are parties. In addition to these obligations, the 
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 Monitoring relates to compliance with general obligations (that is, obligations flowing 
from CoE membership per se and from treaties ratified) as well as with specific 
obligations (that is, obligations undertaken when a country joined the CoE). 
 In accordance with a practice which by now is well-established, two PACE 
members will be appointed as co-rapporteurs for a specific country. When appointing 
co-rapporteurs the Monitoring Committee will seek to ensure a political and 
geographical balance. They will visit the country, where they will typically meet with 
the government, parliamentarians, NGOs and representatives of organisations such as 
UNHCR. The co-rapporteurs will draft a preliminary report and present it to the 
domestic authorities for comments. During this initial stage the documents remain 
confidential, although it is increasingly the case that reports are made public very 
quickly.
39
After the governments’ comments had been received, the matter is discussed 
– first in the Monitoring Committee, and then in the plenary Assembly. The latter 
debates on monitoring are held in public and will result in the adoption of a resolution, 
which are usually fairly detailed.
40
 
 In terms of sanctions, the relevant instruments stipulate that PACE could sanction 
persistent failure to honour commitments, and lack of co-operation in its monitoring 
process, by the non-ratification of the credentials of a national parliamentary 
delegation. Should the country continue not to respect its commitments, the Assembly 
may address a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers requesting it to take the 
appropriate action provided for in Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe. In 
actual practice, the right of vote of the Russian delegation to PACE was suspended 
from April 2000 to January 2001 over the situation in Chechnya.
41
 It does not appear 
that suspension was ever seriously considered by the Committee of Ministers. Of 
course all actors are very well aware of that reality. 
 The first countries to be subjected to the entire procedure, in 1997, were Albania, 
Estonia and Romania. At the moment eleven States are on the Monitoring Committee’s 
work programme: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, 
Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine.
42
 Up to now, 47 country 
reports have been discussed in the plenary meetings of PACE. In addition, a “post-
monitoring dialogue” was developed: when closing a monitoring procedure, the Parlia-
                                                                                                                                                           
authorities of certain states which have become members since the adoption in May 1989 of 
Resolution 917 (1989) on a special guest status with the Parliamentary Assembly freely entered into 
specific commitments on issues related to the basic principles of the Council of Europe during the 
examination of their request for membership by the Assembly” (emphasis added). This was 
consolidated by Order 508 (1995), adopted 26 April 1995: “The Assembly therefore instructs its 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (for report) and its Political Affairs Committee (for 
opinion) to continue monitoring closely the honouring of obligations and commitments in all member 
states concerned” (emphasis added). 
39
  For instance a report of a fact-finding mission to Tblisi, Georgia, that took place 24-27 March, was 
made public on 28 April 2009 and placed on the internet two days later (see doc. AS/Mon(2009) 16 
rev). 
40
  For a recent example see Recommendation 1661 (2009), Honouring of obligations and commitments 
by Serbia, adopted 28 April 2009. 
41  See e.g. Resolution 1444 (2000) on the conflict in Chechnya, adopted 27 January 2000. 
42  See information document AS/Mon/Inf(2008)01rev2 of 25 September 2008. 
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 mentary Assembly may at the same time decide to pursue the dialogue with the 
national authorities on certain issues mentioned in Resolutions adopted, allowing itself 
the choice of re-opening a procedure if further clarification or enhanced co-operation 
would seem desirable. Currently three countries are engaged in a post-monitoring 
dialogue: Bulgaria, Turkey and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. 
 
(b) Other PACE activities 
 
It should be added that the monitoring procedure described so far is not the only way in 
which PACE is instrumental in securing compliance with CoE standards. The work of 
PACE member Mr Dick Marty on ‘rendition flights’ and secret detention sites used for 
anti-terrorist purposes, illustrates that PACE can monitor specific issues in a very 
visible way.
 43
  
 PACE has also been active, since the mid 1990s, in attempts to enhance the 
execution by Member States of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. For 
many years Dutch parliamentarian Mr Eric Jurgens acted as rapporteur on this issue; he 
was succeed in 2006 by Cypriot PACE member Mr Pourgourides whose work was 
mentioned in the introduction of this study. The Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights has so far submitted six reports: one general report and five specific 
ones on the implementation of decisions of the Court, including two reports on Turkey. 
 An interesting initiative was taken in 2006, when the President of PACE wrote a 
letter to the Speakers of all national parliaments, asking in what way their parliaments 
contributed to the execution of Court judgments. The idea behind this is that national 
parliaments can play an important role in the implementation of judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, and that PACE can be instrumental in bringing about 
an exchange of best practices. It would seem, however, that the response to this 
initiative was fairly limited. The lukewarm response of most parliaments seems to 
match a less than enthusiastic attitude by the Committee of Ministers. As we will see 
later on, Article 46 (2) ECHR explicitly charges the Committee of Ministers with the 
supervision of the execution of judgments, and some observers believe that this 
intergovernmental body (or a part of its members) is not particularly eager to see inter-
ference by parliamentarians in this domain. 
 Nevertheless the Committee decided to continue with this theme and authorised 
its rapporteur in early 2009 to carry out fact-finding visits to Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
 A last initiative that deserves attention is the annual debate on “The State of 
Human Rights in Europe”.
44
 This is an attempt to integrate the work of various 
monitoring mechanism into an overall assessment of the human rights situation in the 
CoE Member States. The emphasis is on the countries under monitoring and on 
                                                
43
  See e.g. the report Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving 
Council of Europe member states (Doc. 10957 of 12 June 2006) by Mr Dick Marty, Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights. 
44  See most recently Resolution 1676 (2009), The state of human rights in Europe and the progress of 
the Assembly’s monitoring procedure (adopted 24 June 2009). 
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 countries involved in a post-monitoring dialogue. However, wishing to include also the 
other CoE Member States, PACE has developed a cycle of periodic reports on the 
approximately one third of the remaining states.
45
 The periodic reports are based on the 
country-by-country assessments made by the Commissioner for Human Rights and 
other Council of Europe monitoring mechanisms or institutions. 
 Meanwhile it should not be forgotten that the PACE members have a double 
mandate: they are also parliamentarians at home. As a result they have limited time 
available and, being elected politicians, they may have a certain preference for projects 
that enhance their visibility in the short term. It is therefore crucial that their activities 
are adequately supported by Council of Europe staff. The size of the staff is extremely 
limited. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, for instance, has a 
Secretary who is assisted by less than a handful; a significant part of the work has to be 
done by interns. 
 
2.2.2 Lessons learned 
 
Some characteristics of PACE’s monitoring procedure stand out. It is flexible, both in 
terms of organisation (co-rapporteurs may decide on very short notice to visit ‘their 
country’), themes addressed and the variety of sources used. The introduction of a 
‘post-monitoring dialogue’ is another example of the flexible nature of the procedure. It 
may also be said that the procedure is fairly transparent: documents are available on 
internet; the discussions, at least in the plenary meetings, are public. The fact that the 
monitoring procedure will be extended until PACE is satisfied with the outcome, 
guarantees continuity: periodic visits will continue, and the co-rapporteurs will refer 
back to previous observations in order to see what progress has been made in the 
meantime. The procedure might also be said to be universal in that it may extend to all 
Member States. In this connection it is interesting to recall that the initial format, in 
which the procedure was restricted to new Member States, was quickly abandoned. 
Apparently it is politically difficult to single out specific countries for a prolonged 
period of time. Nevertheless, the monitoring procedure and post-monitoring dialogue 
are in practice only applied to some countries. 
 Another, fairly obvious, characteristic of PACE’s monitoring procedure is that it 
is political. Although PACE is supported by a secretariat which is usually responsible 
for drafting the texts under the direction of the rapporteurs, it is in the end of the day a 
matter of parliamentary debate. Needless to say that no binding judgments are adopted, 
but, more importantly, the very choice to start (or end) the monitoring procedure is a 
political issue. States will have an obvious interest in avoiding the procedure, and often 
parliamentarians vote accordingly. This also applies to the contents of the resolution 
and to possible measures against Member States. When, in the aftermath of the 
Russian-Georgian war in the summer of 2008, it was decided not to reject the 
credentials of the Russian delegation, the Georgian parliamentarians voted against. 
Individual parliamentarians may also have their own agenda. It is said that a rapporteur 
                                                
45  In 2009 this concerned Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France and Germany. 
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 delayed publication of a critical country report with a couple of weeks, because he was 
a candidate for an important position within the Council of Europe and he did not want 
to loose the votes of the parliamentarians of that particular country. 
 It is not so easy to make any firm statements about the actual impact of PACE’s 
monitoring work. It may be an indication that in a number of cases PACE itself was 
satisfied with the outcome of either the monitoring procedure or the post-monitoring 
dialogue; it was then decided to discontinue the procedure.
46
 Former PACE President 
René van der Linden, a strong believer in “parliamentary diplomacy”, claims that the 
Parliamentary Assembly does have leverage, even in very large Member States such as 
Russia.
47
 
 
 
§ 2.3 The Commissioner for Human Rights (CHR)
48
 
 
2.3.1 Description of monitoring activities 
 
(a) Background, staff, and budget 
 
The Commissioner for Human Rights is an independent non-judicial institution within 
the Council of Europe. His mandate is to promote education in, awareness of and 
respect for human rights in the CoE member states.  
 The office of the Commissioner is relatively young: it was established only in 
1999.
49
 The CHR is elected for a non-renewable term of office of six years. As we have 
seen in the introduction, the current Commissioner is Mr Thomas Hammarberg 
(Sweden), who assumed office in 2006. He and his predecessor, Mr Alvaro Gil Robles, 
have managed to put their office in the spotlights: they feature prominently on the 
CoE’s website and they manage to raise publicity when visiting Member States. At its 
most recent meeting in Madrid, the Committee of Ministers confirmed its political 
support for the Commissioner.
50
 
                                                
46  PACE closed in 1997 the monitoring procedure as regards the Czech Republic and Lithuania. It also 
decided in 1999 to close the monitoring procedure on Slovakia. In January 2000, the monitoring 
procedure ended as regards Bulgaria. In April 2000, the Assembly closed the monitoring procedure 
as regards “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, and in September 2000, it ended the 
procedure on Croatia. In January 2001, the Assembly closed the monitoring procedure as regards 
Latvia. Lastly, in June 2004, the Assembly closed the monitoring procedure as regards Turkey. 
Between 2001 and 2005 the Committee recommended to conclude the post-monitoring dialogue with 
Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Latvia. 
47
  See my interview with Mr Van der Linden “Het is cruciaal dat we Rusland erbij houden”, in NJCM-
Bulletin 2007, pp. 967-971. 
48
  The documents mentioned in this section – including the Annual Activity Report 2008, doc. 
CommDH(2009)12 – can be found on the Commissioner’s website: www.coe.int/t/commissioner/. 
49
  See Resolution (99) 50 on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 7 May 1999. 
50
  See the 119
th
 Session of the Committee of Ministers (Madrid, 12 May 2009), at www.coe.int, § 4: 
“The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights carries out his mandate in an outstanding 
way through action in the field and sustained dialogue with member states. The Commissioner’s 
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  The Commissioner is supported by a relatively small office of 13 ‘advisors’, as 
well as support staff dealing with financial and administrative matters and the website. 
In recruiting his staff, the Commissioner took care to attract individuals who had 
working experience in the other CoE monitoring mechanisms; currently the office is 
said to contain a fine mix of specialists. In 2008 the budget (of some € 2 million) 
represented about 1% of the total ordinary budget of the Council of Europe. This was 
supplemented by a total amount of € 855 054 in voluntary contributions.
51
  
 In practice the Commissioner’s office is often enlarged through secondments of 
national civil servants. The advantage is obvious in that the capacity increases and that 
it may be easier to liaise with national administrations. A potential danger is, however, 
that Member States may try to exert influence, through ‘their’ staff, on the 
Commissioner’s work. Quite apart from whether this risk materialises, the institution’s 
perceived independence may be affected. Some observers argue therefore that 
secondments are better to be avoided at all – not just in the case of the CHR, but in 
general. In order to avoid any appearance of risks, the new Director of the CHR Office 
has decided that a secondment is only possible if several candidates have responded to 
a specific job profile (for instance experience in the area of media freedom) and a 
selection on the basis of interviews has been made. 
 
(b) Working method: visits 
 
Apart from a number of other activities (such as the promotion of national human rights 
bodies and the publication of a regular electronic newsletter), the Commissioner is 
probably best-known for his country visits. So far a distinction has been made between 
contact visits, which aim at strengthening the relationships with the authorities and 
looking into one or several specific issues, and assessment visits, the purpose of which 
is to give a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of human rights protection in a 
given country. Each assessment visit is completed by the publication of a report 
containing conclusions and recommendations. These reports tend to be quite elaborate; 
the report on the Commissioner’s visit to the Netherlands comprises of 58 pages and 37 
recommendations, addressing diverse topics such as the treatment of asylum seekers, 
the age of criminal responsibility and the need to remove the exemptions for 
associations based on religion or belief from equal treatment legislation.
52
 According to 
his own website: 
 
The Commissioner seeks to engage in permanent dialogue with Council of Europe member 
states and conducts official country missions for a comprehensive evaluation of the human 
rights situation. The missions typically include meetings with the highest representatives of 
government, parliament, the judiciary, as well as leading members of human rights protection 
                                                                                                                                                           
activity has become fundamental, including in times of crisis. We shall continue to lend him our 
active support, as well as to the Council of Europe independent monitoring mechanisms”. 
51
  These voluntary contributions came from Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Slovak Republic, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
52  See Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, on his visit to the 
Netherlands on 21-25 September 2008 (doc. CommDH(2009)02), Strasbourg, 11 March 2009. 
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 institutions and the civil society. The Commissioner’s reports contain both an analysis of 
human rights practices and detailed recommendations about possible ways of improvement. 
The reports are presented to the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers and the 
Parliamentary Assembly. Subsequently they are published and widely circulated in the policy-
making and NGO community as well as the media. 
 A few years after the official visit to a country, the Commissioner or his Office carries 
out a follow-up visit to assess the progress made in implementing the recommendations. The 
Commissioner subsequently issues a follow-up report, which is also widely publicised.
53
 
 
Thus in the year 2008, the Commissioner paid assessment visits to San Marino, FYRO 
Macedonia, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Serbia, Monaco and Belgium. As a result 
the full cycle of – very time-consuming – assessment visits was completed: all 47 
Member States have now been visited for the purpose of a comprehensive human rights 
appraisal. Still in 2008, contact visits were carried out to Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic, 
the Russian Federation, Poland, Denmark, Romania and Cyprus. At the same time, a 
new approach was developed, with more focused visits with the aim of defining key 
problems and issuing more precise recommendations. This approach included special 
visits to France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Cyprus and Greece. 
  Meanwhile a number of thematic priorities were identified: discrimination on 
grounds of handicap and sexual orientation, the human rights of migrants, the position 
of Roma and Sinti, and the protection of human rights in the fight against terrorism. 
These thematic priorities are given particular consideration during country missions. 
Another priority area is co-operation with ‘National Human Rights Structures’, i.e. 
Ombudsman Offices and National Human Rights Institutions. 
 The Commissioner is to a very large extent free to determine his own agenda, 
which means that he can respond to political developments rapidly. After the war 
between Georgia and Russia, he offered his good offices to both sides and went to the 
region in August, September and November 2008 and once again in February 2009. 
Unlike other international actors he was received by both sides to the conflict and to 
secure the release and exchange of hostages. To mention another example: the 
Commissioner visited Italy in January 2009, as a follow-up to an earlier visit in June 
2008. In the course of this visit the CHR addressed a number of human rights issues 
including action against discrimination, protection of Roma and Sinti and migration.
54
  
 
2.3.2 Lessons learned 
 
The work of the Commissioner shares a number of characteristics with PACE’s 
monitoring procedure. First and foremost it is flexible, both in terms of organisation (he 
may decide on very short notice to visit specific countries), themes addressed and the 
variety of sources used. His country reports and other documents are public; indeed the 
Commissioner is very active in seeking publicity for his activities. The intention to 
                                                
53
  See http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Activities/mandate_en.asp 
54
  See Report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, 
following his visit to Italy on 13-15 January 2009 (doc. CommDH(2009)16), Strasbourg, 16 April 
2009. 
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 engage in an on-going dialogue with governments may guarantee continuity, although it 
is too early to tell if it will be feasible to continue to visit all 47 States on a systematic 
basis.  
 Contrary to the work of PACE, the activities are meant to cover (and in practice 
so far have covered) all Member States. Another difference with PACE’s monitoring 
procedure is that the work of the Commissioner is arguably less politicised – that is: 
there are no public debates and votes on the contents of his findings, or about the 
choice of countries to be visited. As a result, the threshold to deploy activities vis-à-vis 
a particular country is much lower. This is also due to the gradual introduction of new 
monitoring techniques, such as the short ‘single-issue visits’. 
 A challenge is surely posed by the size of the budget and the staff. Admittedly the 
Office was able to grow in recent years – which in itself is exceptional in the context of 
the Council of Europe – and there seem to be long-term plans to expand the staff to 18 
or even 30 advisors. But for the time being it is an open question if the Commissioner 
will be able to live up to his ambitions: to engage in a continuous dialogue with all 
Member States, to explore very diverse themes, to react rapidly to developments which 
may affect human rights in Member States, and so on. At a very practical level the 
duration of country visits tends to be so short, that a meaningful exchange of ideas and 
information will sometimes be difficult to realise. 
 It also seems implausible that the Commissioner and his Office will have the 
capacity to collect and verify all relevant information. Inevitably, then, the 
Commissioner will be largely dependent on country information provided by others. 
These may be other monitoring bodies within the Council of Europa, and NGOs. Both 
categories of suppliers may actually be quite pleased to have the Commissioner carry 
their message, especially if they themselves face constraints in searching for publicity. 
The Commissioner for his part seems to be happy with the role of messenger as well – 
the report of his visit to Belgium, for instance, included references to the findings of no 
less than 13 supervisory bodies (excluding NGOs and domestic bodies): CEPEJ, the 
UN Committee against Torture, the CPT, the European Court of Human Rights, the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, the European Parliament, ECRI, the UN Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (“Venice Commission”), PACE, the Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the UN 
Human Rights Committee.
55
 The idea behind this must be synergy – it is hoped that the 
Commissioner will be able to generate additional pressure to have the 
recommendations of other supervisors accepted. 
 
 
                                                
55
  See Report by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, 
following his visit to Belgium on 15-19 December 2008 (doc. CommDH(2009)14), Strasbourg, 17 
June 2009. 
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§ 2.4 The European Court of Human Rights
56
 
 
2.4.1 Description of monitoring activities 
 
(a) The Court 
 
It would be superfluous to introduce the European Convention on Human Rights or the 
European Court of Human Rights in any detail. It is common ground that the Court is 
unique. In terms of numbers, no other international tribunal deals with so many cases. 
In terms of substance, no other supervisory body has been able to reach such a level of 
sophistication in shaping and refining human rights and rule of law standards. In terms 
of significance, the Court’s judgments have an impact matched by no other human 
rights body – not only on the parties whose disputes are settled in final and binding 
rulings, but also on the community of 47 Contracting Parties who change their domestic 
law and practice in a continuous process of adaptation to the Convention. 
 It is also common ground that (a) the Court consists of 47 full-time judges who 
meet high standards of expertise and independence, and who, having been nominated 
by their respective governments, are elected for a 6 year term by the Parliamentary 
Assembly; (b) the Registry comprises over 230 lawyers and a extensive supporting 
staff; (c) the Court is free, in reviewing applications, to take into account materials 
from various sources
57
 and developments that have occurred after the impugned 
national decisions were taken
58
; (d) being a judicial organ, the Court is essentially 
passive: it will respond to applications lodged, but it will not investigate situations of its 
own motion; (e) the Court’s judgments are binding; and (f) judgments may include 
separate opinions. There is an increasing willingness of the Court to take into account 
other human rights treaties when interpreting the ECHR – even treaties which the 
respondent State in a particular case has not ratified.
 59
 
 Increasingly the Court pays express attention to structural problems underlying the 
individual case at hand, and it no longer shies away from giving rather specific 
instructions to the respondent States. The Broniowski case is a well-known example. 
The case concerned a very large group of Polish citizens who had once possessed land 
and property in territories that Poland had lost to the Soviet Union after World War II. 
Since 1946, Polish law had entitled these former owners to compensation – but the 
State Treasury had been unable to meet all compensation claims. The Court found a 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and noted that the failure to pay compensation 
originated in a systemic problem. In view of the magnitude of the problem, the Court 
issued a so-called ‘pilot judgment’. In this judgment, the first of its kind, the Court 
                                                
56
  Most information and documents mentioned in this section can be found on the Court’s website: 
www.echr.coe.int. 
57
  See e.g. ECtHR (GC), 28 February 2008, Saadi v. Italy (Appl. No. 37201/06), §§ 128-131. 
58
  Ibidem, § 132, see also ECtHR (GC), 23 June 2008, Maslov v. Austria (Appl. No. 1638/03), § 93. 
59  See esp. ECtHR (GC), 12 November 2008, Demir & Baykara v. Turkey (Appl. No. 34503/97), §§ 65-
86. 
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 endeavoured to give guidelines for a general settlement.
 60
 
 A more recent example involves the failure to enforce the judgments of domestic 
courts in Russia. In Burdov (No. 2) the Court, in the operative part of the judgment: 
 
6. Holds that the respondent State must set up (...) an effective domestic remedy or 
combination of such remedies which secures adequate and sufficient redress for non-
enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic judgments in line with the Convention 
principles as established in the Court’s case-law; 
7. Holds that the respondent State must grant such redress, within one year from the date on 
which the judgment becomes final, to all victims of non-payment or unreasonably delayed 
payment by State authorities of a judgment debt in their favour who lodged their applications 
with the Court before the delivery of the present judgment and whose applications were 
communicated to the Government (...); 
8. Holds that pending the adoption of the above measures, the Court will adjourn, for one year 
from the date on which the judgment becomes final, the proceedings in all cases concerning 
solely the non-enforcement and/or delayed enforcement of domestic judgments ordering 
monetary payments by the State authorities (...).
61
 
 
Judgments like these may put additional pressure on States to implement previous 
Court rulings and thus to comply with international obligations freely entered into. 
 This is not to say that there are no weak points or threats. The European 
Convention is by no means an exhaustive human rights catalogue. There are various 
dimensions of the rule of law (such as the fight against corruption within the judiciary) 
which do not translate well in individual complaints: applicants may find it difficult to 
substantiate their allegations to the extent that the Court’s standards of proof are met.
62
 
Also the Court’s fact-find capacity is very limited, it has difficulties in addressing 
systemic problems and large-scale human rights violations. Victims may feel frustrated 
when they discover the Court’s limited powers to address the consequences of 
violations. The Court cannot re-open proceedings at national level, strike down laws 
which are found to be incompatible with the Convention, or grant a resident permit. 
Pursuant to Article 41 of the ECHR, the Court may (or may not) find one or more 
violations of the Convention, and, if a violation is found, award ‘just satisfaction’ to the 
victim. 
 
(b) The Court’s workload  
 
As is well-known, the Court is seriously overburdened. As a result, it takes years before 
cases, even urgent ones, are dealt with. As of 1 July 2009, the Court has roughly 
108,000 applications pending before one of its judicial formations: Committee, 
                                                
60
 ECtHR, 22 June 2004, Broniowski v. Poland (Appl. 31443/96). For the aftermath see the decision of 
28 September 2005, striking out the Broniowski case, and also ECtHR, 4 December 2007, 
Wolkenberg v. Poland (Appl. 50003/99). 
61
  ECtHR, 15 January 2009, Burdov v. Russia (No. 2) (Appl. 33509/04). 
62  See e.g. ECtHR, 3 July 2007, Flux v. Moldova (No. 2) (Appl. No. 31001/03), with a partly dissenting 
opinion of Judge Bonello. 
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 Chamber, or Grand Chamber.
63
 Of these cases, 55% emanates from Russia (27.0%), 
Turkey (10.6%), Romania (8.8%) and Ukraine (8.6%). There are a further 22,000 
applications at the pre-judicial stage. A relatively high percentage of them will never 
require a judicial decision and be destroyed administratively because the applicants do 
not follow up their initial communication. But they still lay a considerable claim on the 
Registry’s capacity. 
 The 108,000 applications that are awaiting a judicial decision, vary widely in 
terms of complexity and importance. About two-thirds will be disposed of summarily 
by a Committee of three. As regards the potentially well-founded cases, there are 
approximately 39,600 currently pending before Chambers. About half of these are so-
called repetitive cases, i.e. cases deriving from the same structural cause in a given 
country.
64
 If the responsible authorities are slow in remedying the situation, similar 
complaints continue to be brought before the Court. These complaints do not require 
any sophisticated treatment, all legal issues having been resolved in previous case-law. 
But they nevertheless claim part of the Court’s capacity, even if it is merely operating 
much like a claims commission: admissibility, facts and compensation have to be 
assessed in each individual case. 
 There remain a further 20,000 or so cases raising substantial and/or novel 
Convention issues. These cases in a way justify the very existence of the Court; by 
deciding these cases the Court can really have an impact on the operation of national 
legal systems and the daily lives of citizens. The Court’s inability to deal speedily with 
these cases, is really the most serious problem facing the Convention system. But even 
in this category there are relatively few leading cases – 0.47% in 2007, to be precise.
65 
In other words: the Court’s capacity is to a large extent absorbed by cases that (a) do 
not relate to human rights violations or (b) are not of great significance. As a result the 
real victims suffer, since they have to wait for years before the Court can deal with 
their case.  
 Of course there are attempts to cope with the case-load. Protocol 14 is meant to 
further streamline the procedure before the Court, but it will only enters into force after 
all 47 States have ratified it; so far Russia has failed to do so. An interim solution was 
found through the adoption of Protocol 14bis in May 2009: the Court’s procedure will 
be simplified in cases involving the countries that become party to it.66 This is not the 
                                                
63
  The figures mentioned here can be found on the Court’s website, www.echr.coe.int. 
64
  Notorious examples are length of proceedings and non-execution of final judicial decisions (see e.g. 
ECtHR, 7 May 2002, Burdov v. Russia (Appl. 59498/00). 
65
  In 2007, the Court delivered 136 ‘level 1’ rulings (109 judgments, 27 admissibility decisions), i.e., 
rulings which in the eyes of the Court itself ‘make a significant contribution to the development, 
clarification or modification of its case-law, either generally or in relation to a particular State’. In the 
same period, the Court delivered 28,792 judgments and decisions. In other words: 0.47 per cent of all 
cases fell in category 1 (and this percentage would drop to 0.32 if the calculation were to take into 
account the 13,417 files that were disposed of administratively in 2007). Perhaps this limited 
percentage is in itself not unacceptable, but the Court’s overload leads to serious delays. Of the 10 
‘level 1’ judgments issued in November 2007, two concerned applications brought in 2000, one in 
2001 and two in 2003. 
66  Official named Protocol No. 14bis to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
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 place, however, to discuss this issue in great detail. 
 
(c) The Committee of Ministers (CM) – general 
 
The Committee of Ministers (CM) is the main policy-making body of the Council of 
Europe. Officially it is made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each Member 
State, but they meet only once or twice per year. In daily practice the CM is composed 
of diplomatic representatives, usually with the rank of ambassador, permanently based 
in Strasbourg. The Committee of Ministers approves the CoE budget and programme of 
activities, and it is competent to adopt conventions and recommendations addressed to 
Member States. 
 In addition the CM carries out a number of specific tasks. Mention has already 
been made, in § 2.2.1 above, of the monitoring procedure that was established in 1994. 
In this section we will focus on another task. Pursuant to Article 46 (2) of the ECHR, 
the Committee is responsible for supervising the execution of judgments. It will ensure 
in the first place that payment of any just satisfaction decided by the Court is made as 
ordered. Secondly, the Committee will see to it that individual measures are, where 
necessary, taken in order to ensure restitutio in integrum – i.e., that the victim is put, as 
far as possible, in the same situation as he enjoyed prior to the violation of the 
Convention.
67
 Thirdly, the CM will examine if general measures are, where necessary, 
adopted in order to avoid new similar violations of the Convention in the future.
68
 Once 
the CM is satisfied that all necessary measures have been taken, its adopts a so-called 
‘final resolution’. 
 Given the ever-increasing number of judgments it is hardly surprising that this 
supervisory function is becoming a heavy burden too. The CM devotes four special 
sessions per year on this issue. At one such meeting, in March 2008, the Committee 
examined draft final resolutions to close 121 cases in which the respondent states had 
complied with their obligations under the Convention. The Committee also started the 
supervision of the execution of 185 new judgments of the Court. It then supervised the 
payment by respondent states of just satisfaction awarded by the Court to applicants in 
845 cases, the adoption of other individual measures granting redress to the applicants 
in 139 cases or groups of cases and/or the adoption of general measures aimed at 
preventing new similar violations in 178 cases or groups of cases.
69
 The next meeting, 
of June 2008, featured a staggering total of 3,726 cases on the agenda. By the end of 
2008, over 7,000 cases were pending with the Committee of Ministers. At the most 
recent meeting, from 2-5 June 2009, the CM started the supervision of the execution of 
                                                                                                                                                           
Fundamental Freedoms adopted in Strasbourg, on 27 May 2009. European Treaty Series No. 204. 
For full text see conventions.coe.int. At the time of writing (July 2009) six States had ratified it. 
67
  These measures may consist, for instance, of re-opening of proceedings at national level, granting of 
a resident permit, striking-out of criminal records. 
68
  E.g., constitutional, legislative or regulatory amendments, a change in administrative practice or in 
case-law, publication and/or dissemination of the Court's judgment. 
69
  More information can be found on the special CoE web site dedicated to the execution of judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights. See http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/execution/. In 
addition annual reports on this issue have been published in March 2008 and April 2009. 
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 another 476 new judgments of the Court.  
 The CM is assisted by a special section of the CoE Secretariat, the Department for 
the Execution of Judgments of the ECtHR. There is an interesting dialectic between the 
‘intergovernmental’ Committee of Ministers and the ‘international’ Department. When 
preparing the Human Rights Meetings, the Department will inquire with the respondent 
States whether all necessary execution measures have been taken. De Boer, a long-time 
participant in the CM Human Rights Meetings, observes that the Department is “very 
precise” in verifying if measures have actually been taken.
70
 Sometimes there are 
discussions when States argue that the Department is going beyond the obligations that 
flow form a particular judgment. 
 In this connection De Boer also noted that the Member States tend to take a 
cautious attitude towards one another. In addition he observed that groups of countries, 
such as the Scandinavians, prepare the Human Rights Meetings with a view to arriving 
at common positions. He is under the impression that countries such as Turkey, Italy 
and Russia – who are markedly opposed to the possible introduction of new sanctions 
and share a common interest in this matter – harmonise their positions in advance.
71
 
 Lodeweges, who worked for this Department notes that, as a result of the large 
numbers, it has become impossible to discuss the execution of each individual case.
72
 
Similar cases may be clustered and be discussed jointly. Since the documentation for 
the Human Rights Meetings is voluminous, it seems safe to assume that many 
delegations will not have studied all materials. As a result, the question whether a Court 
judgment has been properly executed or not becomes a debate – or a written exchange 
of views – between the Department and the representative of the State concerned; third 
States rarely intervene if they do not have a direct interest at stake. 
 It is commonly understood that the compliance rate is very high. Of the thousands 
of judgments delivered, there are only two known cases where the respondent State 
refused to execute a judgment: the Loizidou case (which established Turkish 
responsibility for violations in the northern part of Cyprus) and the Ilascu case (which 
established Russian responsibility for violations in a separatist region of Moldova).
73
 In 
both cases the Committee of Ministers exercised considerable diplomatic pressure, and 
in the end, even in these two cases solutions were found.
74
 Still, De Boer feels that the 
impact of these resolutions is usually rather limited – but the Committee has very few 
other means at its disposal to make its point and put some pressure on a country. The 
                                                
70
  G. de Boer, ‘Hof en raad hebben elkaar nodig’, in NJCM-Bulletin 2006, pp. 77-82, at p. 81. Mr. De 
Boer is seconded by the Dutch Ministry of Justice to the Dutch Permanent Representation in Stras-
bourg. 
71
  Ibidem, p. 80. 
72
  A. Lodeweges, ‘Executie-impressies. Ontwikkelingen in de praktijk van de tenuitvoerlegging van 
Hof-uitspraken’, in NJCM-Bulletin 2008, pp. 949-953. 
73
  ECtHR (GC), 28 July 1998, Loizidou v. Turkey (Art. 50) (Appl. 15318/89) and ECtHR (GC), 8 July 
2004, Ilascu a.o. v. Moldova and Russia (Appl. 48787/99). 
74
  In Loizidou the Turkish government agreed, in 2004, to pay the amounts awarded by the Court. In 
Ilascu the Russian Federation had been ordered by the Court to use its influence in order to secure the 
applicants’ release, but Moscow continued to argue that it did not have the influence ascribed to it. In 
the end the applicants were released by the ‘MRT’ authorities after they had served their ‘sentence’. 
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 fact that Turkey was willing to compromise in the Loizidou case, De Boer suggests, 
may also have to do with Turkey’s wish to improve the climate for accession talks with 
the EU.
75
 
 Leaving these two exceptional cases aside, it must be acknowledged that States 
are sometimes slow, or even reluctant, to take the necessary general measures. Both 
slowness and reluctance may undermine the authority of the Court, and it is therefore 
important that the Committee may then exert pressure on the State concerned. The CM 
may do so behind the scenes, or publicly, through the adoption of ‘interim resolution’. 
In March 2009, for instance, the CM adopted a new interim resolution concerning the 
excessive length of judicial proceedings in Italy. The Committee of Ministers noted 
that 
 
notwithstanding the measures taken, the statistics for the years 2006-2007 still show an 
increase in the length of proceedings in particular before certain jurisdictions (justices of 
peace [giudici di pace] and courts of appeal), as well as a substantial backlog in the civil and 
criminal fields (approximately 5.5 million pending civil cases and 3.2 million pending 
criminal cases), and that therefore a permanent solution to the structural problem of length of 
proceedings must be found.
76
 
 
The Committee therefore called upon the Italian authorities to pursue actively their 
efforts to ensure the swift adoption of the measures already envisaged for civil and 
criminal proceedings and to adopt urgently ad hoc measures to reduce the civil, 
criminal and administrative backlog. It also strongly encouraged the authorities to 
consider amending Act No. 89/2001 (the so-called Pinto Law) with a view to setting up 
a funding system resolving the problems of delay in the payment of compensation 
awarded, to simplify the procedure, and to extend the scope of the remedy to include 
injunctions to expedite the proceedings put into question. 
 It is too early to analyse the effect of this particular Interim Resolution on Italy 
(leaving the question of causality aside), but the point is that the Committee of 
Ministers has had this very topic on its agenda since the 1980s. Apparently the 
Committee of Ministers has not been able to force Italy into compliance as far as the 
length of judicial proceedings is concerned. 
 
(d) The Committee of Ministers (CM) – recent trends 
 
In recent years the use of internet has been intensified. For instance, it is now possible 
for outside observers to check on a country-by-country basis the state of execution of 
so-called all leading cases and other cases raising specific execution issues. For each 
case a standard format is used, providing comprehensive information about individual 
and general measures taken, the assessment of the secretariat, as well as any decisions 
taken by the CM so far.77 
                                                
75
  G. de Boer, ‘Hof en Raad hebben elkaar nodig’, in NJCM-Bulletin 2006, at p. 79. 
76  Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2009)42, adopted 19 March 2009. 
77  See http://www.coe.int/t/e/human%5Frights/execution/03%5FCases/. 
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  But there is more to be reported. The CM is keenly aware of the urgent need to 
take concrete measures at the national level so as to address the root causes of the 
Court’s case-load.
78
 For one, more emphasis is being placed on co-operation. The 
Second Annual Report mentions that states are proposed, wherever needed, different 
forms of assistance in defining and/or implementing the necessary execution measures, 
notably taking into account interesting practices of other states: 
 
“Whereas such activities were previously only undertaken on an infrequent ad hoc basis, such 
activities have now become a more regular feature of the supervision of execution. Activities 
may be limited to the respondent state but may also encompass groups of states with similar 
problems. The CM has allowed a special budget for this purpose starting in 2007, clearly 
signalling its increased importance: the 2007 expenses were just over 52 000 euros, the 2008 
totalled almost 66 000. This increase is, of course, reflected in the number of activities, which 
also increased by over 20% from 2007 to 2008. The 2009 budget totals 90 000 euros. 
Activities include, in particular, high level discussions with competent authorities, expert 
opinions on legislation and training sessions either in the country concerned or in 
Strasbourg”.
 79
 
 
In addition, a most important development is the new Human Rights Trust Fund set up 
in 2008. The mission of the Fund, inter alia, is to assist in ensuring full and timely 
execution of judgments of the ECtHR. The Fund, a Norwegian initiative, has approved 
its first projects. The Assembly of the Fund’s Contributors has recently allocated 
almost € 785,000 to the financing of execution-related activities in certain key areas: 
the non-execution of domestic court judgments in six countries and the responses to 
violations of the ECHR by security forces in the Chechen Republic.
80
 It is still too early 
to say anything about the results of this initiative. But in May 2009 the Netherlands 
announced that it would contribute € 250,000 to the Fund, and indicated that it intended 
to make similar donations in the years 2010-2012. Of course there may be various 
foreign policy considerations behind this gesture, but one would assume that the Dutch 
government is only prepared to make scarce resources available if it believes that the 
money will be well-spent. 
 
2.4.2 Lessons learned 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has all the advantages and disadvantages of a 
judicial body. It delivers binding judgments following a procedure characterised by 
equality of arms. In the 50 years of its existence the Court has acquired a unique status, 
                                                
78
  For a description, see H.L. Janssen, ‘Protocol 14 bij het EVRM. Met maatregelen in Straatsburg zijn 
we er nog niet: de toekomst van het Hof ligt in de handen van de verdragspartijen bij het EVRM’, in 
T. Barkhuysen, M. Kuijer & R.A. Lawson (eds.), 55 jaar EVRM (speciale aflevering NJCM-
Bulletin), 2006, pp. 123-133. 
79
  CoE Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the execution of judgments of the ECtHR – 2
nd
 Annual 
Report 2008 (Strasbourg, April 2009), p. 11. 
80  Ibidem, pp. 11-12. 
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 and the authority of its findings is undisputed.
81
 In its judgments it seeks to set out the 
general principles applicable in the case at hand, thereby showing why a violation was 
found. This may guide the State in identifying shortcomings in its legal system. The ‘pilot 
judgments’ present a new step in this development. 
 On the other hand the Court is not a perfect mechanism to monitor compliance with 
the ECHR. For one, it will only review the situations that are presented to it in the form of 
applications. The right to individual petition may be an excellent way to detect problems, 
but it all depends on the ‘vigilant individual’ (to borrow a term from Community law) 
who must be willing and able to lodge complaints in Strasbourg. Thus it was only several 
years after the armed conflict in Chechnya broke out, that the Court dealt with its first 
Chechen case – before that, there were simply no applications. The Court’s case-load 
creates similar problems. In the case of A. a.o. v. UK (2009) the Court reviewed certain 
British anti-terrorism measures.
82
 Whereas the judgment is of great importance for the 
interpretation of the ECHR, it does not assess the current state of affairs in the UK – the 
anti-terrorism measures had been abolished in 2005. 
 The Committee of Ministers supervises the execution of Court judgments. Publicity 
for this activity is made through press releases, special websites and (since 2008) annual 
reports. To that extent the procedure may be regarded as transparent. Still it is difficult for 
the outsider to follow what happens when the execution of specific cases is discussed 
behind closed doors. Insiders report that political/diplomatic considerations do play a 
role. Objectivity is ensured, however, at least to a certain degree, through the involvement 
of an independent secretariat, i.e. the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the 
ECtHR. 
 Interestingly the CM and the Secretariat co-operate in monitoring experiments. 
Countries are increasingly encouraged to co-operate and to exchange experiences in 
solving similar problems. Funds are made available for countries that are willing to 
change but lack the capacity to do so. 
 
 
                                                
81
  Of course there are exceptions. See e.g. ECtHR, 27 March 2008, Shtukaturov v. Russia (Appl. No. 
44009/05), § 38, in which the St Petersburg court explains why it will not give any follow-up to an 
interim measure indicated by the ECtHR (stipulating that the applicant should be allowed to have 
access to his lawyer): “The Russian Federation as a special subject of international relations enjoys 
immunity from foreign jurisdiction, it is not bound by coercive measures applied by foreign courts 
and cannot be subjected to such measures ... without its consent”. 
82  ECtHR (GC), 19 February 2009, A. a.o. v. UK (Appl. No. 3455/05). 
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§ 2.5 The Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT)
 83
 
 
2.5.1 Description of monitoring activities 
 
(a) Background 
 
The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (for the sake of brevity referred to as CPT) is a non-judicial 
treaty body, composed of independent experts. It is based on the 1987 Convention for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, that 
was concluded in the framework of the Council of Europe. All CoE Member States 
have ratified the Convention. 
 
(b) Working method: visits 
 
The starting point of the Convention is that all States parties are already bound by the 
ECHR and that they all accept the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-
treatment. That prohibition is supplemented by the Convention, which aims to 
strengthen domestic structures for the protection of individuals who, for whatever 
reason, are deprived of their liberty by State organs. Thus the CPT visits places of 
detention (prisons, police stations, psychiatric hospitals and so on); the purpose is to 
see how persons deprived of their liberty are treated and, if necessary, to recommend 
improvements to States. The CPT has unlimited access to places of detention and the 
right to move inside such places without restriction. It may interview persons deprived 
of their liberty in private and communicate freely with anyone who can provide 
information. It follows from the above that the CPT is not meant to identify and remedy 
individual cases of ill-treatment. The CPT is about prevention and systemic 
improvement; individual victims should turn to their domestic courts and, if necessary, 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
 CPT delegations visit all Contracting States periodically. In practice the CPT is 
able to carry out about ten regular visits per year, which means that it will visit a 
country every four to five years. Insiders feel that this frequency is sufficient; also 
because additional ad hoc visits may be organised whenever necessary. Thus, an ad hoc 
visit to Armenia in March 2008 was triggered by events which followed the presidential 
election held the previous month. On 1 March 2008, a police operation took place aimed 
at dispersing opposition rallies in Yerevan. The CPT subsequently received numerous 
reports according to which dozens of persons had been arrested in the course of and 
following that operation. It was alleged that law enforcement officials had frequently used 
                                                
83
  Most information and documents mentioned in this section can be found on the CPT’s website: 
www.cpt.coe.int. For more background see esp. the work of Bristol professors M. Evans & R. 
Morgan, such as Preventing Torture (Oxford 1998), Protecting Prisoners (Oxford 1999), Combating 
Torture (Council of Europe 2001). See also J. de Lange, Detentie genormeerd – Een onderzoek naar 
de betekenis van het CPT voor de inrichting van vrijheidsbeneming in Nederland (diss. Rotterdam, 
2008). 
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 excessive force at the time of apprehension, and concern was expressed about the fate of 
those taken into detention. The CPT decided that it should examine on the spot the 
situation of persons detained in connection with the post-election events and seek detailed 
information on the force used during the 1 March operation.
84
 At first sight this comes 
close to offering individual protection, but the primary purpose of the CPT was to ensure 
that there were adequate mechanisms in place in Armenia to handle individual cases of 
ill-treatment. 
 The Committee must notify the State concerned of its intention to pay a visit but 
does not have to specify when the actual visit will take place and which establishments 
will be visited. This keeps an element of surprise, which is considered necessary to get 
a reliable picture of the reality. In practice the CPT publishes, in November or 
December, a list of States which it intends to visit during the following year. 
 
(c) Reporting 
 
On the basis of the facts found during the visit, the CPT will formulate recommenda-
tions. These are included in a report which is adopted by the plenary Committee, and 
then presented to the State concerned. The report is confidential until publication is 
authorised by the respondent Government. Over the years it has become custom for the 
State parties to allow publication of the Committee’s report together with their 
response. Several countries, including the Netherlands, tend to authorise publication of 
the CPT report even before their own response is available. A few countries, including 
Russia and Turkey, have been reluctant to allow publication of ‘their’ CPT report at all. 
But this is becoming more exceptional; by now all Turkish reports are in the public 
domain. So far, the CPT has made 270 visits (165 periodic visits and 105 ad hoc visits); 
220 reports have been published. When assessing these statistics it should be kept in 
mind that the reports about the more recent visits are simply not adopted yet. 
 The adoption of the report is not seen as an end in itself: it is meant to be the 
starting point for an ongoing dialogue with the State concerned. It is a well-established 
practice for the CPT to refer back to previous findings when carrying out follow-up 
visits. For instance, the CPT carried out follow-up visits to “the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia” in October 2007 and June/July 2008, specifically aimed at 
examining the steps taken by the national authorities to implement recommendations 
made by the CPT after earlier visits. On this issue the CPT stated in its most recent 
General Report: 
 
“As has been stressed before, a country’s cooperation with the CPT cannot be described as 
effective in the absence of action to improve the situation in the light of the Committee’s 
recommendations. Over the years, there has been no shortage of ‘success stories’. However, it 
is also the case that the failure of States to implement recommendations repeatedly made by 
the CPT on certain issues remains a constant refrain of the Committee’s reports. Few countries 
visited over the last twelve months have escaped this criticism”.
85
  
                                                
84  See 18th General Report on the CPT’s activities (Strasbourg, 18 September 2008), § 5. 
85  See 18th General Report on the CPT’s activities (Strasbourg, 18 September 2008), § 16. 
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The CPT has two guiding principles: co-operation and confidentiality. Co-operation 
with the national authorities is at the heart of the Convention, since the aim is to protect 
persons deprived of their liberty rather than to condemn States for abuses. It is believed 
that co-operation is made easier by confidentiality. The idea is that States are more 
likely to share sensitive information and engage in frank discussions with the CPT if 
they know that information will not be passed on to others, unless they agree to it. The 
Committee therefore meets in camera and, as mentioned above, its reports are 
confidential until publication has been authorised. In this respect the CPT clearly 
differs from the other monitoring bodies discussed so far. Within the Council of Europe 
the CPT was always known for its ‘secretish’ attitude: it consistently refused to share 
information with other CoE bodies, including the Human Rights Court, even on an 
informal basis. It would appear that this is changing somewhat in recent times. The 
CPT will still not forward any confidential information, but it becomes more willing to 
share information that does necessarily qualify as confidential. Various factors may 
play a role: the Member States may have become used to the CPT and as a result less 
adamant on the issue of confidentiality; staff has moved from the Court’s Registry to 
the CPT’s secretariat and vice versa; and the Court’s new President, Mr Costa, has 
made an effort to intensify the contacts between the two bodies. 
 Having said that, confidentiality remains the rule. Nevertheless, if a country fails 
to co-operate or refuses to improve the situation in the light of the Committee’s 
recommendations, the CPT may decide to make a public statement. It has done so only 
in exceptional circumstances, involving Turkey and the Russian Federation. 
 In addition, the CPT draws up a general report on its activities every year, which 
is made public. Interestingly the CPT has developed a tradition to include in these 
general reports standards relating to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty. 
Already in its Second General Report (covering 1991) the CPT paid attention to “some 
issues related to police custody of criminal suspects and imprisonment”. The 
Committee explained that it intended to give a clear advance indication to national 
authorities of its views regarding the manner in which persons deprived of their liberty 
ought to be treated and, more generally, to stimulate discussion on such matters. The 
“substantive” standards drawn up so far also deal with training of law enforcement 
personnel, health care services in prisons, foreign nationals detained under aliens 
legislation, involuntary placement in psychiatric establishments and juveniles and 
women deprived of their liberty. These standards have been published also in separate 
brochures.86  
 This practice adds a new dimension to the scheme used in paragraph 1: 
 
                                                
86  See http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/docsstandards.htm. 
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A final observation concerns the lack of any systematic follow-up at the political level. 
Unlike the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, the country reports of 
the CPT are not on the agenda of the Committee of Ministers. One might be inclined to 
see this as a weakness, especially in the case of countries who fail to improve the 
situation for a number of years.
87
 Political pressure might back-up the work of the CPT. 
It would seem, however, that the CPT itself is not unhappy at all with the situation. If 
its reports became the subject of discussion in the CM, the reasoning goes, the CPT 
would be drawn into a political discussion. That might frustrate the co-operation with 
the States concerned. 
 
(d) Membership, staff, and budget 
 
The CPT members are elected for a four-year term by the Committee of Ministers and 
can be re-elected twice. One member is elected in respect of each Contracting State. 
The CPT has always been composed of a combination of lawyers, medical doctors and 
specialists in prison or police matters. In case of vacancies the CPT will informally 
advise the Committee of Ministers about its views concerning the ideal professional 
background of new members, so that a proper balance may be maintained. The CM 
may take this into account when electing new members. Currently candidates are not 
interviewed or tested in any way about their knowledge and language skills. Observers 
regret this and point to the contrast with the election procedure for the European Court 
of Human Rights: all candidates are interviewed by a delegation of the Parliamentary 
Assembly. There is also pressure to make the nomination process of candidates for the 
Court mere transparent. In 2007 the Parliamentary Assembly itself called for an 
enhanced procedure of appointment of CPT members.
 88
  
 Visits are carried out by delegations, usually of two or more CPT members, 
accompanied by members of the Committee’s Secretariat and, if necessary, by 
additional experts and interpreters. The member elected in respect of the country being 
                                                
87
  See e.g. the CPT report on Greece, quoted in footnote 12 supra. 
88
  See Resolution 1540 (2007), Improving selection procedures for CPT members, adopted 16 March 
2007: “[t]he CPT’s continued authority depends on the moral standing, professional qualifications 
and personal implication of all its members”. 
(2) 
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 visited does not join the delegation. 
 The CPT is assisted by a Secretariat which is divided in three divisions. Leaving 
administrative staff aside, each division is composed of a head and three 
administrators, who usually have a background in law, but sometimes also other areas 
such as medicine. Each division is responsible for the activities vis-à-vis 16 countries, 
which means that every single official has to ‘cover’ four countries. The CPT is also 
confronted with budgetary constraints. The budget for 2009 enabled the Committee to 
develop a programme with 185 “visit days”.
89
 The CPT itself believes that the ultimate 
goal is an annual programme of 200 visit days: this is the volume of visit days required 
to cope effectively with the workload generated by 47 Parties to the Convention. 
 A substantial part of the budget has to be spent on translation costs. In order to be 
able to monitor the situation in, for instance, Latvia, the CPT and its Secretariat must 
have access to new legislation and jurisprudence. This means that documents will have 
to be translated into one of the working languages.
90
 Country visits also claim high 
interpretation costs, as CPT delegations tend to split up in order to be able to visit as 
many institutions as possible – but this implies that, ideally, each delegation member is 
accompanied by an interpreter. In practice, however, budgetary constraints entail that 
delegation members have to share an interpreter, which diminishes the efficiency of the 
visit. 
 
2.5.2 Lessons learned 
 
Over its years of activity in the field, the CPT has developed great expertise in the 
treatment of detainees. An interesting feature of its membership is that there has always 
been an attempt to arrive at ‘the right mix’ of lawyers, medical specialists and other 
experts. Attention for the selection process of new members is growing, though. The 
Committee makes use of very diverse sources, and never fails to contact civil society in 
the context of a country visit. Its unprecedented powers of access to places of detention 
enable it to achieve a very sophisticated level of fact-finding. The CPT’s findings are 
referred to by the European Court of Human Rights on a regular basis,
91
 and it seems fair 
to say that the CPT is highly regarded by the Member States – even if its 
recommendations are not always followed.
92
 
 The annual working programmes pre-determine the CPT’s activities to a 
considerable extent, but this is compensated by the possibility to pay ad hoc visits if the 
circumstances so require. The frequency of on-site visits is relative low (once every 4-5 
years), but this does not appear to be a problem for the purposes of the CPT. 
                                                
89
  See 18
th 
General Report on the CPT’s activities (Strasbourg, 18 September 2008), § 37. 
90
  This is all the more true since not all nationalities are represented in the Secretariat. In this respect 
the CPT differs from the Court with its large Registry. The relevant committees of PACE each have a 
small Secretariat too, but, unlike the CPT, they do not seem to collect information from all Member 
States on a systematic and on-going basis. 
91
  See e.g. ECtHR, 6 March 2001, Dougoz v. Greece (Appl. No. 40907/98), §§ 40, 46; ECtHR (GC), 19 
February 2009, A. a.o. v. UK (Appl. No. 3455/05), §§ 117, 132. 
92  See the remarks in footnotes 20 and 25 supra. 
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  The CPT has always emphasised the need for an on-going dialogue with domestic 
authorities. The visits are not seen as an end in itself, but as part of a long-term co-
operation. No public information is available about the nature or outcome of this “on-
going dialogue”, so it is difficult to say anything about its effectiveness. On the other 
hand, the extent to which the Committee’s previous recommendations have been 
implemented is always on the agenda of a CPT delegation. In this respect continuity is 
guaranteed. 
 Apart from the possibility to issue public statements – which is rarely used – the 
Committee does not have the power to impose sanctions. Rather, the CPT relies on close 
co-operation with national authorities. There is no institutionalised follow-up at the 
political level of the Committee of Ministers, but the CPT does not appear to regret that. 
In order to protect its relationship with national authorities, the CPT takes the rule of 
confidentiality very seriously. It will not share its information with any outsiders, nor with 
any other CoE bodies, unless it has been made public. Whether this secrecy adds to the 
Committee’s effectiveness is impossible to state for the outside observer. 
 
 
§ 2.6 The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)
 93
 
 
2.6.1 Description of monitoring activities 
 
(a) Background, staff, and budget 
 
Organisations such as Transparency International have put the fight against corruption 
in the spotlights, but the issue already received attention in the Council of Europe in the 
early 1980’s, when the Committee of Ministers recommended to take measures against 
economic crime, including bribery.
94
 Since then the Organisation has drafted a number 
of instruments (conventions, guiding principles and recommendations) dealing with 
matters such as the criminalisation of corruption in the public and private sectors, 
liability and compensation for damage caused by corruption, conduct of public officials 
and the financing of political parties.
95
 
  The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) was established in 1999 by 
the Council of Europe to monitor States’ compliance with the organisation’s anti-
corruption standards. Currently, GRECO comprises 46 Member States (45 European 
States and the USA). Each Member State appoints up to two representatives – often 
senior officials from the Ministry of Justice – who participate in GRECO plenary 
                                                
93
  Most information mentioned in this section can be found on, and § 2.6.1 is largely based on, 
GRECO’s website: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/. 
94
  See Recommendation No. R (81) 12 on economic crime, adopted 25 June 1981. 
95
  See esp. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (27 January 1999; ETS 173; entry into force 2002, 
by now 41 ratifications); Civil Law Convention on Corruption (4 November 1999, ETS 174; entry 
into force 2003, by now 33 ratifications); Recommendation No. R (2000) 10 on Codes of Conduct for 
Public Officials; Recommendation (2003)4 on Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of 
Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns; and the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption (15 May 2003; ETS 191; entry into force 2005, by now 24 ratifications). 
R.A. Lawson — Lessons from CoE Monitoring 
 
 
 
40   40 
 
 
 meetings with a right to vote. At present Liechtenstein and Monaco are the only CoE 
Member States still not to have joined GRECO. 
 GRECO is assisted by a small secretariat, provided by the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe. The Secretariat, which is headed by an Executive Secretary, 
consists of a deputy and five administrators, as well as support staff. The budget for 
2009 is slightly more than € 2 million – actually an increase of 13% when compared to 
the previous year. That increase is rare in the context of the Council of Europe, and 
may be seen as an indication that GRECO is doing well. 
 
(b) Working method: the evaluation process 
 
GRECO intends to improve the capacity of its members to fight corruption through 
what is called “a dynamic process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure”. Thus, all 
Member States participate in, and submit themselves without restriction to, the mutual 
evaluation and compliance procedures. In this connection two types of procedure are 
distinguished: 
 
• a “horizontal” evaluation procedure whereby all members are evaluated within 
an Evaluation Round, leading to recommendations for legislative, institutional 
and practical reforms; 
• a compliance procedure designed to assess the measures taken by its members to 
implement the recommendations. 
 
Each evaluation round covers specific themes. GRECO’s first evaluation round (2000–
2002) dealt with the independence, specialisation and means of national bodies 
engaged in the prevention and fight against corruption. It also dealt with the extent and 
scope of immunities of public officials from arrest, prosecution, etc. The second 
evaluation round (2003–2006) focused on the identification, seizure and confiscation of 
corruption proceeds, the prevention and detection of corruption in public administration 
and the prevention of legal persons (corporations, etc) from being used as shields for 
corruption. The third evaluation round (launched in January 2007) addresses (a) the 
incriminations provided for in the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and (b) the 
transparency of party funding. 
 The clear and rather narrow focus of each evaluation round seems to have 
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand a thorough, in-depth analysis of 
national law and practice is made possible; recommendations can really be meaningful. 
On the other hand GRECO sometimes has to ignore obvious problems because they 
‘belong’ to another evaluation round. GRECO’s ability to fulfil its mission would be 
enhanced if the evaluation procedure had more flexibility, but Member States might 
argue that this would lead to unequal treatment of States. The answer to that concern 
would be that the standards are the same for all States, but that, depending on 
differences between the States, different responses are called for. 
 Unlike PACE, the Commissioner for Human Rights and the CPT, GRECO does 
not have a specific instrument to respond to urgent situations: GRECO’s task is 
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 primarily about structural changes in the area of policies, legislation, practices and so 
on. As a result the emphasis is on medium and long term strategies. 
 
(c) The evaluation rounds in practice  
 
The evaluation process starts with the establishment of a team of experts for the 
evaluation of a particular member. The experts (academics, practitioners, government 
officials and so on) are selected from lists submitted by each Member State. Although 
the experts are appointed by GRECO itself, it is the secretariat that tables a first 
proposal, taking into account the need to strike a geographical balance and to have a 
sound division of expertise; a team should not contain, for instance, two prosecutors. 
Experts will never be involved in the evaluation of their own country. For each 
evaluation round new lists of experts are compiled, taking into account the substantive 
expertise that is required for that particular round. 
 The analysis of the situation in each country starts with written replies to a 
questionnaire. The secretariat may seek additional information where necessary. Then 
an on-site visit takes place. The purpose is on the one hand to meet with public 
officials, politicians, journalists, the chamber of commerce, representatives of civil 
society and so on. On the other hand the on-site visit allows for a better assessment of 
the situation ‘on the ground’. There may for instance be a gap in the law, and the 
written replies to the questionnaire may have been ambiguous as to how this gap is 
dealt with in practice. It may then be very useful to ask judges and prosecutors how 
they see the situation. The visits typically last one week, which is said to be enough 
given the narrow focus of the evaluation. 
 Following the on-site visit, the secretariat and the experts draft a report which is 
communicated to the country under scrutiny for comments. There may be a ‘pre-
meeting’ to clarify certain issues and open questions. On this occasion the wording of 
draft recommendations may also be discussed, but this is not the primary objective of 
the meeting. 
 Finally the draft report is submitted to GRECO for examination and adoption. The 
discussions in GRECO are said to be very lively and – unlike what we were told about 
the situation in the Committee of Ministers
96
 – other countries may be actively 
involved. The explanation would be that these countries themselves haven been 
subjected to scrutiny and may have received recommendations which they found hard 
to accept; so in turn they want to make sure that the same strict standards are applied to 
other States as well. This ‘peer driven’ insistence on coherence seems to add greatly to 
GRECO’s effectiveness. The difference with the ECHR and the attitude of the 
Committee of Ministers might be explained by the existence of clear legal standards 
relating to a small and well-defined area and by the fact that GRECO members know in 
advance that all States have to go through the same test sooner or later. 
 The conclusions of evaluation reports may state that legislation and practice 
comply – or do not comply – with the provisions under scrutiny. The conclusions may 
                                                
96  See § 2.4.1 (c), footnotes 69-71 and accompanying text, supra. 
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 lead to recommendations which require action within 18 months. In the past, GRECO 
also used to formulate observations which members were supposed to take into account 
but were not formally required to report on in the subsequent compliance procedure.  
 One of the strengths of GRECO’s monitoring procedure is that it does not stop 
here. The implementation of recommendations is examined in the compliance 
procedure. The Member State under scrutiny must show, 18 months after the adoption 
of the evaluation report, whether it has implemented a recommendation. If not all 
recommendations have been complied with, GRECO will re-examine outstanding 
recommendations within another 18 months. Depending on the progress made, GRECO 
may decide whether to terminate the compliance procedure in respect of a particular 
member. Put schematically: 
 
 
 
In 2008, GRECO carried out 12 on-site visits, adopted 12 evaluation reports and over 
20 compliance reports. An interesting dilemma occurred when GRECO was asked to 
provide support to members: how to reconcile its role as a monitoring body with 
providing formal advice/assistance on how to implement the recommendations that 
resulted from its own monitoring? In the end it was decided that guidance could be 
provided, but that GRECO would remain free in its assessment of the situation.
97
 The 
situation illustrates that one cannot always make a sharp distinction between 
‘monitoring’ and ‘assistance’ – or that it may be artificial or even counter-productive to 
do so. Yet, within the structure of the Council of Europe these two activities are 
allocated to separate directorates. 
 On a final note it is interesting to observe that there is also, to some extent, a 
GRECO ‘jurisprudence’ on most topics that have come under evaluation so far. Thus, 
standards have emerged concerning issues such as determining how far a prosecutor 
should be (in)dependent, at what stage do immunities become an obstacle to prosecuting 
corruption offences and who may legitimately enjoy immunities apart from 
MPs/government members/the national ombudsman, how much should be expected in 
terms of guidance on the detection of corruption-related money laundering by private 
sector entities, how independent should a party financing control body be, etcetera. The 
development of these ‘GRECO standards’ is explained by the fact that the standards 
contained in the basic instruments, especially the resolution and the recommendations, 
are sometimes drafted in very broad terms and need some kind of ‘interpretation’. 
Observers maintain that GRECO has established some important milestones and 
progressive practice over the years, often after very intense discussions. At the same time 
                                                
97  See Ninth General Activity Report of GRECO (2008) (Strasbourg, Feb. 2009), p. 10. 
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 these standards are not easily perceptible due to the technicality of certain aspects. 
 
2.6.2 Lessons learned 
 
The example of GRECO provides us with a number of interesting innovations: (a) the 
combination of evaluation procedures leading to recommendations and a compliance 
procedure to ensure that recommendations are implemented; (b) the involvement of 
independent experts (who “cannot be missed”, one observer emphasised) and government 
representatives during distinct phases of the process; and (c) rather active peer pressure 
which is driven by the fact that exactly the same test is applied to all countries 
consecutively. The latter element leads to a desire amongst the Member States for 
coherence and increases the credibility of recommendations. 
 It might be suggested to increase the flexibility of the evaluation procedure. The 
effectiveness of the monitoring would undoubtedly be enhanced if the mandate were 
less rigid. It remains to be seen, however, if all Member States would support such a 
change. 
 Again it is difficult to make firm statements about the actual impact of GRECO. 
There are success stories, such as Georgia, which was severely criticised in the first 
evaluation round but showed a lot of progress in the second round. A causal link with the 
work of GRECO is not always easy to establish, even if changes in the domestic law 
often answer very directly to recommendations made by GRECO. The question then 
arises whether such changes are attributable to GRECO only. It often happens that a 
variety of anti-corruption pressure groups (including NGOs, media and academics) refer 
to GRECO findings and recommendations for improvements. In doing so they amplify 
the activities of GRECO. Apparently these actors regard GRECO as a credible institution 
with convincing reports and recommendations. 
 
§ 2.7 The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ)
 98
 
 
2.7.1 Description of monitoring activities 
 
(a) Background, staff, and budget 
 
The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) was established in 
2002.
99
 It is based not on a convention, such as the ECHR or the CPT, but on a 
resolution. The Committee of Ministers took as a starting point that “the rule of law on 
which European democracies rest cannot be ensured without fair, efficient and 
accessible judicial systems”. The idea behind CEPEJ was to improve inter-state co-
operation in this area a very practical way: to compare judicial systems, to exchange 
experiences, and to define concrete means to improve the functioning of the judicial 
                                                
98
  Most information mentioned in this section can be found on, and § 2.7.1 is largely based on, CEPEJ’s 
website: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/. 
99  See Resolution (2002) 12 establishing the European Commission for the efficiency of justice 
(CEPEJ), adopted 18 September 2002. 
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 systems in Europe. The scope extends beyond ‘mere’ efficiency in a narrow sense: it 
includes the quality and the effectiveness of justice. According to the Statute of CEPEJ, 
these tasks shall be fulfilled by, among others,  
 
“(a) identifying and developing indicators, collecting and analysing quantitative and 
qualitative figures, and defining measures and means of evaluation, and (b) drawing up 
reports, statistics, best practice surveys, guidelines, action plans, opinions and general 
comments”. 
 
The CEPEJ is composed of experts from all the 47 Member States of the Council of 
Europe; most are magistrates or senior officials from the Ministry of Justice. The 
CEPEJ is assisted by – another – small secretariat consisting of seven members 
(including documentation and assistance). Apart from staff costs, its modest budget 
allows for little more than a few expert meetings per year. 
 
(b) Working method: data collection 
 
In practical terms, the CEPEJ has undertaken a regular process for evaluating judicial 
systems of the participating states. Its Working Group on the evaluation of judicial 
systems (CEPEJ-GT-EVAL) is in charge of the management of this process. The 
collection of data – and thus the development of common statistical criteria – have 
been central concerns. After a pilot evaluation of judicial systems (2002-2004) two 
regular evaluation cycles (2004-2006 and 2006-2008) followed. CEPEJ will send a 
questionnaire to each Member State and receive written answers by national 
correspondents. These correspondents tend to be officials of the Ministry of Justice or 
of the council of the judiciary. 
 Unlike CPT and GRECO there are no on-site visits; there are no expert teams that 
will examine a country any closer; nor is there a possibility to consult other national 
sources to verify the data supplied by national correspondents. This makes that CEPEJ 
is heavily dependent on the quality of their work. In this system of self-reporting the 
correspondents are fully responsible for the quality and reliability of the data that they 
supply. If a state fails to provide data at all, the CEPEJ does not have any sanctions at 
its disposal.
 100
 
 The national evaluations feed into comprehensive reports which are made 
available on the CEPEJ website.
101
 These reports contain a wealth of information about 
the functioning of the judiciary in Europe. The website also contains the contributions 
of the national correspondents. Although the national replies vary in their degree of 
detail, they often contain additional explanations. They are therefore potentially a 
useful complement to the overall report. 
                                                
100
  According to the 2008 report, “Albania has provided very few answers to the questionnaire” whereas 
Liechtenstein and San Marino were not able at all to provide data for this report (see pp. 10-11). 
101
  See European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) - European judicial systems - 
Edition 2008 (2006 data): Efficiency and quality of justice. This 334-page report was adopted by the 
CEPEJ during its 11th plenary meeting (2–3 July 2008) and published on 8 October 2008. 
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  So CEPEJ is essentially about data collection. National reports are not discussed 
in a monitoring body (as in GRECO); there are no findings about compliance with pre-
existing standards or recommendations (as in CPT). Conversely, Member States do not 
give systematic feedback on their own activities in response to the findings of CEPEJ. 
In France, for instance, the comparative data complied by CEPEJ have been used in 
discussions to increase the budget of the judiciary, and in the Netherlands a 
professional journal devoted a special issue to the work of CEPEJ
102
 – but these are in a 
way incidents that happen to occur and there is no institutionalised way to report back 
on these developments to CEPEJ. 
 Perhaps more than any of the other monitoring bodies described so far, the CEPEJ 
has experienced that “the comparison of quantitative figures from different countries 
set against the varied geographical, economic and legal situations is a delicate job”.
103
 
The quality of the figures will necessarily depend very much on the definitions used by 
the national correspondents – seemingly straightforward questions, such as the budget 
allocated to the courts, may be interpreted in many different ways –, the system of 
registration in the countries, the national figures available and the way the figures have 
been processed and analysed. In seems unavoidable that variations occur when national 
respondents interpret the questions for their country and try to match the questions to 
the information available to them. Against that background, the CEPEJ has engaged in 
a continuous process of developing and fine-tuning the questionnaires and the 
guidelines that accompany them. 
 
(c) Other activities 
 
Meanwhile, the CEPEJ has set up a number of working groups, dealing for instance 
with mediation and the execution of court decisions in civil, commercial and 
administrative matters at national level. The Working Group on quality of justice 
(CEPEJ-GT-QUAL) is instructed to develop means to analyse and evaluate the quality 
of the work done inside the courts. The Working group will therefore collect 
information on evaluation systems existing in the member states, and improve tools, 
indicators and means for measuring the quality of judicial work. In doing so, the 
Working Group will have to respect the principle of independence of judges. 
 Along similar lines a Centre for judicial time management (SATURN Centre - 
Study and Analysis of judicial Time Use Research Network) was established in 
2007.
104
 The Centre is instructed to collect information necessary for the knowledge of 
judicial timeframes in the member States. The purpose is to enable member states to 
implement policies aiming to prevent violations of the right for a fair trial within a 
reasonable time protected by Article 6 ECHR. Again an important task is to define and 
improve measuring systems and common indicators on judicial timeframes in all 
member states and to develop appropriate modalities and tools for collecting 
                                                
102
  “Het Nederlandse rechtsbestel in Europees perspectief’, special issue of Justitiële verkenningen, vol. 
35/4 (2009), with summaries in English. Available in full text via www.wodc.nl. 
103  See the 2008 report, p. 12. 
104  See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/Delais/default_en.asp. 
R.A. Lawson — Lessons from CoE Monitoring 
 
 
 
46   46 
 
 
 information through statistical analysis. 
 
2.7.2 Lessons learned 
 
All in all a mixed impression of CEPEJ remains. On the one hand CEPEJ is in the 
process of accumulating an impressive body of data on the organisation and 
administration of Justice in Europe. But on the other hand, from an institutional point of 
view, there are a number of weaknesses when CEPEJ is compared to other monitoring 
bodies – indeed one could even ask if CEPEJ can be seen as a ‘monitoring body’ in the 
first place, or rather as a forum for co-operation. But leaving semantics aside, it is clear 
that the work of CEPEJ is entirely dependent on self-reporting by national 
correspondents; there are no instruments to verify the data supplied by them; and there 
is little organised feedback about the findings between the CEPEJ and the Member 
States. 
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§ 3 Some concluding observations  
 
§ 3.1 Summary of main findings 
 
What lessons can be learned from the above? Apart from some recurring themes (such as 
a serious shortage of funding) we have seen considerable differences between the various 
monitoring bodies set up by the Council of Europe. Some differences have a historical 
background, others have been inserted on purpose, taking into account the subject-matter 
of the monitoring exercise. But one thing is clear: there is no single blueprint. Perhaps the 
most useful way to structure our findings a little bit is to get back to the factors that were 
suggested in § 1.5. 
 
• Mandate 
It is important to point out at the outset that both the European Court of Human 
Rights and the CPT are treaty bodies. They have an unequivocal legal basis for their 
activities, in the form of binding conventions providing for a clear mandate. The 
standards that they supervise, are legally binding standards. The latter is also true 
for GRECO105 and the Commissioner for Human Rights (CHR), even if they were 
‘only’ established in resolutions of the Committee of Ministers.  
 Since compliance with these standards is a legal obligation, and not just a 
desirable policy, the process of monitoring is in essence a legal matter as well. It is 
not subject to prioritisation or quid pro quo. It may be helpful to their impact if the 
legal work is amplified at one stage in the political arena (notably the Committee of 
Ministers (CM) or the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE)), but this should not dilute 
the outcome of the legal assessments made. 
 Whereas PACE and the CHR are by all means free to respond to sudden 
developments, GRECO’s agenda is pre-determined by the well-defined cycles that 
it has to go through. Some argue that GRECO’s rigid agenda entails diminished 
effectiveness, but at the same time the narrow focus allows for detailed and in-
depth investigations. CPT is a bit in-between: it has annual working programmes 
but it remains possible to organise ad hoc missions. 
 As to the geographical scope of monitoring, there is a constant tension 
between the principle of equality (which means that all countries should be 
covered) and the desire to focus on ‘problematic’ countries. The CPT, GRECO and 
the CHR address all countries, but they have devised various ways to pay extra 
attention to those countries that are found to be in default of their obligations. It is 
interesting to observe that PACE started its monitoring activities with an exclusive 
focus on the new CoE Member States, then expanded so as to include all Member 
States, and then developed specific instruments for ‘problematic’ countries. 
 
                                                
105
  Strictly speaking one should distinguish between the three treaties dealing with corruption and the 
political instruments (one resolution and two recommendations). The latter derive their binding effect 
in practice from the fact that they too are subjected to GRECO’s monitoring. 
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• Membership 
Independent experts are essential, according to virtually all observers. They bring 
(or are supposed to bring) expertise, impartiality and credibility. The ECtHR and 
CPT are composed of, and GRECO relies to a large extent on, independent experts, 
who derive their authority from their own qualifications and from they fact that they 
were nominated by their own countries and elected by PACE or the Committee of 
Ministers. Several observers argue that the personality of the experts is of crucial 
importance: they may make or break any monitoring body. An extreme example of 
the ‘human factor’ is how the monitoring procedure of the Committee of Ministers 
simply fell in disuse after the Deputy Secretary-General of the Council of Europe 
left the organisation. At a different level the same phenomenon occurs at the 
secretariats of the monitoring bodies: often they operate in the shadow, but they can 
be extremely influential in supporting, and steering, their ‘bosses’.106 In this 
connection it was also noted that the secondment of national civil servants in 
secretariats may have advantages and disadvantages; it seems advisable to have 
careful and transparent selection procedures. 
 All this is not to suggest that politicians (as in PACE) or government 
representatives have no useful role to play. The procedure of GRECO, which 
involves both experts and representatives, seems to combine the best of both 
worlds. The experts provide the factual analysis and propose recommendations; the 
government representatives discuss and decide, thereby securing political support 
for the final outcome. But experiences differ: it seems that the dynamics in GRECO 
is very different from that in the Committee of Ministers when supervising the 
execution of Court judgments. The narrow scope of GRECO’s work and the more 
or less technical nature of the issues at stake may explain why the active 
involvement of government representatives appears to be so constructive. 
 
• Quality of input 
When it comes to the quality of the information on which to base its work, CEPEJ 
faces two problems. On the one hand the comparability of data is problematic, 
because different countries have different definitions and methodologies. This is 
problem that may be solved over time, when common understandings emerge. On 
the other hand, a clear weakness of CEPEJ is its dependence on self-reporting by 
national correspondents. There are no means to verify the information. On-site 
visits – which play a key role for CPT, CHR and GRECO – do not occur in the 
framework of CEPEJ. The Commissioner faces another problem: for capacity 
reasons he depends to a large extent on country information from other CoE bodies. 
                                                
106
  In a similar vein, albeit in a somewhat different context, see the conclusion of the Commission’s 
Report on the practical operation of the methodology for a systematic and rigorous monitoring of 
compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights (COM(2009) 205 final, at p. 9): “perhaps the 
most important element which needs to be worked upon is the human element. The fundamental 
rights reflex has to be promoted in the services of the Commission where proposals and initiatives are 
created and a ‘fundamental rights culture’ fostered from the earliest stages of the conception of a 
Commission proposal”. 
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• Review process 
Again there are huge differences between the monitoring bodies when it comes to 
the processing of information. The CPT collects its own information, discusses the 
situation internally and presents the country concerned with a report once it is 
adopted. What follows is a ‘dialogue’ with the national authorities on how to 
implement these recommendations, and there will be follow-up visits, but there is 
no institutionalised follow-up phase in, say, the Committee of Ministers. The CPT 
itself does not appear too eager to have such a follow-up, as it fears to be drawn 
into a political discussion where conclusions tend to be watered down. 
 The procedure before European Court of Human Rights has similarities: 
following an application there will be an adversarial procedure where both parties 
can advance their views of the case; then there are internal deliberations and a 
decision or judgment is adopted. The main difference with the CPT is that the 
execution of the judgments is supervised by the Committee of Ministers. There are 
no indications that because of this follow-up, the Court is drawn into politics. Even 
if States tend not to interfere too much in the execution of cases that involve other 
countries, it still seems safe to say that the Committee of Ministers – supported by 
the Secretariat – gives a useful back-up to the Court. It puts pressure on the 
respondent State to take both specific and general measures. 
 A subtle innovation was developed by PACE: a “post-monitoring dialogue”. 
When closing a monitoring procedure, the Parliamentary Assembly may at the 
same time decide to pursue the dialogue with the national authorities on certain 
issues mentioned in Resolutions adopted, allowing itself the choice of re-opening 
a procedure if further clarification or enhanced co-operation would seem 
desirable. A similar approach has been institutionalised in GRECO. After an 
overall evaluation round, which leads to the adoption of country-specific 
recommendations, GRECO will initiate the so-called compliance procedure. The 
Member State under scrutiny must show that they have complied with the 
recommendations within 18 months after their adoption . 
 A last issue to be addressed is continuity. To what extent do monitoring 
bodies ensure the issues that they have raised previously, do not simply disappear 
from the agenda? The CPT will always refer back to previous observations in 
order to see what progress has been made in the meantime, and so most 
rapporteurs for PACE. The European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, 
simply responds to the complaints that are submitted to it, and it is only gradually 
seeking ways to see to it that the respondent State has addressed the problems that 
were identified in previous judgments. The prevailing view has always been that 
supervision of execution falls essentially outside the Court's jurisdiction, being 
entrusted to a political body, the Committee of Ministers.107 
 
                                                
107  On this issue, see most recently ECtHR, 30 June 2009, VgT v. Switzerland (Appl. No. 32772/02). 
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• Standard-setting through monitoring 
Both the European Court of Human Rights and the CPT refine their standards 
continuously through their work. The Court delivers leading cases which clarify the 
meaning of the rights and freedoms contained in the Convention; the CPT gradually 
develops its own standards and publishes these, not in country reports but in its 
annual reports. A similar development takes place with GRECO, although it is 
perhaps less visible due to the technical nature of some of its standards. Also there 
is less scope to develop jurisprudence in so far as GRECO bases its activities on 
conventions which are more specific and elaborate than, say, the ECHR or the 
prohibition of torture. There is more need for standard-setting in areas where 
GRECO works on the basis of more loosely drafted recommendations. CEPEJ, for 
its part, may be able to identify trends and best practice, which in the future could 
lead to the development of European standards.  
 No clear picture emerges when it comes to the uniformity of standards. 
Uniform standards are legitimate but may not fit the situation of individual States; 
country specific evaluations which do not follow a commonly agreed framework 
may make more sense to the country concerned but may at the same time be seen 
as discriminatory. GRECO is clearly on the ‘uniform’ side of the scales (for the 
time being its Member States guard against deviations); the Commissioner’s 
country reports and PACE’s various monitoring activities are much more tailor-
made. 
 
• Outcome 
Publicity, which paves the way for the mobilization of shame, may be of key 
importance. Again, there are differences. CPT reports are only made public after 
the respondent State has authorised publication. There is some pressure to do so, 
however, since publication has become the standard and silence the exception. 
The rulings of the Court are by definition public, and so are the findings of the 
Commissioner. It would seem that the latter is the most active in seeking publicity. 
The discussions in PACE and the resolutions adopted are public as well. 
 It is striking to observe that whereas the monitoring bodies will no doubt have 
up-to-date information at their disposal, few of them actually give their views of 
‘real time developments’. If a human rights violation occurs, it will typically take 
five to six years – after exhaustion of domestic remedies! – before the European 
Court of Human Rights rules on the case. The CPT for its part visits countries in 
principle only once every four years; its reports usually become public between one 
and two years after the visit took place. One cannot, therefore, base an opinion on 
the current state of affairs in, say, Polish prisons by consulting CPT reports 
alone.
108
 This is not to say, of course, that the CPT is ignorant of domestic 
developments taking place in between visits; on the contrary, its staff is well-
informed and collects information on an on-going basis. But the point is that the 
                                                
108
  The most recent CPT report on Poland that is available dates from March 2006, and relates to a visit 
that took place in October 2004 – five years before the present study was conducted. The CPT’s next 
visit to Poland is scheduled for 2009. 
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 CPT does not provide policy-makers – or NGOs, or the general public – with its 
analysis of events occurring here and now: the establishment of a new high-security 
institution, a situation of serious overcrowding in alien detention centres after a 
sudden influx of irregular immigrants, and so on. If its views are not heard, or only 
several years later, common sense suggests that the domestic impact of the CPT 
must be lower. Admittedly the CPT states that it engages, after publication of its 
report, in an on-going dialogue with the domestic authorities. But to the outside 
world this remains invisible and one cannot say anything about the effectiveness (or 
indeed the agenda) of this dialogue behind the scenes. One thing is sure: the 
element of publicity, and therefore an opportunity to mobilize of shame, is absent.  
 The preceding passage referred to the CPT, but same goes for the other 
monitoring bodies. CEPEJ published a highly detailed report in October 2008 – but 
the data related to 2006. GRECO may have up-to-date information, but only on 
very specific issues and only in connection with countries whose turn it is to be 
subjected to an evaluation round.  
 Another observation, which follows from what precedes, is that – despite (or 
maybe because of) the multitude of monitoring bodies – there is no overall picture 
of the human rights situation in a specific State. In recent times the Parliamentary 
Assembly has tried to fill that gap by organising debates on “The State of Human 
Rights in Europe”. But this essentially boils down to a country-by-country 
enumeration of the findings of separate monitoring bodies, which is still a far cry 
from an overall and integrated analysis. 
 This general problem of lagging behind is compensated to some extent by the 
power to indicate interim measures (ECtHR) or carry out ad hoc visits (CPT, 
Commissioner and PACE). 
 
• Follow-up – on sticks and carrots 
The emphasis in this study has been on monitoring – not on assistance. One could 
argue that the two are separate issues, and indeed the organizational chart of the 
Council of Europe shows that ‘monitoring’ and ‘co-operation’ have been 
allocated to different directorates. Yet this distinction cannot always be 
maintained. Monitoring bodies, such as GRECO, are asked – just because of their 
expertise – to assist countries in reviewing domestic law and practice. Likewise it 
could be argued that countries may be more keen to discuss their problems, if 
they know that they will be helped solving them, rather than just criticized. Seen 
in this perspective, the establishment of the Human Rights Trust Fund in 2008 is 
an important step. The mission of the Fund, inter alia, is to assist in ensuring full 
and timely execution of judgments of the ECtHR. It is too early to tell whether 
the Fund is really a success, but common sense dictates that ‘monitoring’ and 
‘assistance’ should not be separated; a marriage may well bear fruit. 
 And what about sanctions? First of all it should be recalled that the purpose 
of monitoring is not to punish States, but to get countries to the point that they 
make their legal systems compatible with the legal obligations that they freely 
entered into, and that they ensure that their citizens enjoy their rights effectively. 
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  Having said that, the ‘nuclear option’ – suspension of membership or even 
expulsion from the Council of Europe – is so radical, that it is hardly a realistic 
option. PACE may decide not to accept the credentials of a parliamentary 
delegation, but that weapon cannot be used too often either. Harvey argues that the 
Council of Europe mechanisms “come out very favourably” when compared to the 
EU (where ex ante control of candidate countries human rights records is 
comprehensive but ex post control is considerably restricted in scope). At the same 
time he is fairly critical in his assessment. The lack of meaningful sanctions plays 
an important part in his analysis: 
 
There is nothing wrong with ex post conditionality per se. If it builds in some flexibility to 
the admissions process and if accepting partial progress is an incentive to further progress 
then it is desirable policy. But there is a point where ex post conditionality becomes an 
oxymoron. The question turns upon whether post-accession instruments for ensuring 
compliance are sufficiently strong to compensate for having given away the carrot of 
membership.
 109
 
 
 
§ 3.2 The EU: the way ahead 
 
What lessons can we draw from the experience of the Council of Europe, if we wish to 
identify factors that should be taken into account when reflecting on rule of law monitoring in the 
EU? 
 The first remark must be that the Council of Europe is more than just an interesting 
‘monitoring laboratory’ for the EU. It has developed credible instruments, many of which 
have functioned well for decades, despite limited funding. The Memorandum of 
Understanding of 2007 between the two organisations confirms the need to avoid 
duplication and to make better use of existing resources. 
 This means that a clear and convincing case must be brought if the introduction of a 
new monitoring mechanism in the context of the EU is contemplated. Of course one may 
readily agree (as was argued in § 1.2) that there is a special need for mutual trust, and 
thus for monitoring, in the EU. But that leaves the question unanswered where this 
monitoring should take place: should there be a new structure in the EU, can we rely on 
existing structures in the Council of Europe, or should we invest in the Council of Europe 
in order to improve its mechanisms? 
 It is submitted that one should only resort to new initiatives in the context of the EU, 
if it is clear that the existing CoE mechanisms cannot do the job and cannot be improved 
so as to do the job. This may be the case. After all it is conceivable that the functioning of 
the Union requires compliance with more rigorous standards than could be agreed upon in 
the context of the larger, less-integrated Council of Europe. It is equally possible that the 
EU Member States are prepared to create more daring monitoring mechanisms as 
‘confidence building measures’ than the 47 CoE Member States are willing to accept.  
                                                
109  See P. Harvey, The Future of the European Court of Human Rights (PhD thesis EUI, Florence, 
defended 12 April 2007; as yet unpublished), p. 76. 
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  But whatever argument is made, the point is that one needs to show the added value 
of a new EU monitoring mechanism. Indeed, this is all the more imperative given the 
‘monitoring fatigue’ that was described in § 2.1: some Member States have serious 
difficulties in meeting all the existing reporting requirements and others are simply 
becoming less co-operative. They need to be convinced. The core of the argument must 
be that better monitoring is possible – and that it is in their own interest. 
 If we assume that in the short term the debate in the EU will focus not so much on 
the introduction of higher standards, but rather on more effective ways to monitor 
compliance with existing ones, then the following considerations become relevant.  
 
o In terms of mandate it is crucial to avoid an agenda that is too rigid. This takes two 
dimensions.  
 First, if it is to be of any relevance for policy makers, it is essential that a 
monitoring body is in a position to respond to developments as they take 
place. Especially in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters one must be able to address current developments. This was illustrated 
by the wave of Dutch asylum cases immediately after the S.D. v Greece 
judgment (see § 1.2). In this connection it is also revealing that the 
Parliamentary Assembly has found ways to organise its agenda in a very 
flexible way: politicians realise how important it is to respond immediately to 
important developments. As the example of the Commissioner for Human 
Rights shows, it is useful to have a pre-determined annual working programme, 
provided that there is sufficient flexibility to organise ad hoc missions 
whenever necessary. The CPT may carry out ad hoc visits too, but its voice 
will be heard only rarely in the public debate, since the CPT reports appear 
with large intervals and after considerable delays only. Such a situation is 
likely to diminish the usefulness of reports as policy input. 
 Secondly, the example of GRECO shows that one also needs flexibility in 
another way. Although a narrow focus has the advantage that it allows for a 
thorough, in-depth analysis, GRECO sometimes has to ignore obvious 
problems because they ‘belong’ to another evaluation round. Observers argue 
that GRECO’s ability to fulfil its mission would be enhanced if the 
evaluation procedure had more flexibility. The argument of some Member 
States that this would lead to unequal treatment of States, could be countered 
with the observation that the standards remain the same for all States, but 
that, depending on differences between the States, different responses are 
called for. 
 
o When it comes to membership, there is widespread agreement within the Council 
of Europe that independent experts cannot be missed. They bring expertise, 
impartiality and credibility. The European Court of Human Rights and the CPT are 
composed of independent experts; the Commissioner for Human Rights is 
independent; GRECO relies on independent experts to carry out evaluations. They 
are indispensable. Ideally they derive their authority from their own qualifications 
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 and from the way in which they were elected.  
 On the other hand, there are sound arguments to involve government represen-
tatives too: they can secure political support for the final outcome and may also 
introduce a kind of peer pressure that independent experts cannot create. The 
procedure of GRECO, which involves both experts (legal assessment) and 
representatives (formulation of policy recommendations), seems to offer an 
attractive combination. But much depends on the subject-matter: if the monitoring 
concerns specific and unequivocal legal standards which do not leave much room 
for discussion, then the added value of government representatives in the decision-
making process becomes less clear.  
 Be that as it may, the crucial importance of the ‘human factor’ should be 
underlined. ‘Strong personalities’ may make all the difference (see also § 2.2.1). 
 
o Another crucial factor is the quality of input available to the monitoring body. The 
monitoring body should have up-to-date information at its disposal and – unlike 
CEPEJ – a possibility to verify the reliability of data with independent sources. The 
possibility to carry out on-site visits is also important, both to get a feeling for the 
situation on the ground but also to liaise with national actors.  
 It goes without saying that any EU monitoring body should take into account 
(and indeed base itself) all relevant materials from the Council of Europe. Given 
that there is a risk that parallel monitoring structures arrive at different results (and 
that States may be tempted to search for, and maximise, differences), care must be 
taken to avoid confusion and conflict.  
 A somewhat related issue is that of continuity: once a monitoring body has 
picked up an issue, it should not let the State concerned ‘get off the hook’ before 
the issue is settled. One should ensure that States actually ‘absorb’ the outcome of 
monitoring exercises. CPT and PACE delegations always refer back to previous 
findings in order to find out what the authorities have done in response to them. 
GRECO has developed an innovative  separate ‘compliance procedure’ to this end 
which is worth studying. 
 
o Further standard-setting should be allowed as part of the monitoring process. This 
is especially the case if the subject-matter has been regulated in loosely drafted 
texts that require further interpretation.  
 
o Publicity is another element that should be taken into account. Confidential 
mechanisms may of course be useful and indeed effective, but they lack the 
possibility of the mobilization of shame. Various commentators from within the 
Council of Europe argue that in the end this is an indispensable element for any 
monitoring body. For that reason the Commissioner for Human Rights is very 
active in seeking publicity. Likewise the Parliamentary Assembly seeks to reach the 
general public, for instance by organising debates on “The State of Human Rights 
in Europe”.  
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o On a final note, although a lot of attention tends to go to the question of sanctions 
in the case of non-compliance, it is perhaps more important to look at possibilities 
for assistance. Arguably countries are more keen to discuss their problems, if 
they know that they will be helped solving them, rather than just criticized. The 
establishment of the Human Rights Trust Fund in 2008, and the substantial 
support announced by the Dutch government, shows that this approach is gaining 
weight. 
